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PREFACE 
Congress was concerned with many aspects of the army. Congress had 
created the Continental Army and felt very responsible for military affairs. 
Thus under such close supervision the relations between Congress and its 
military arm were many and varied. The army's finance, clothing, food, trans-
portation, enlistments, and the place of state militias, were some of the 
problems that confronted the Congress and army. 
For this thesis I have chosen Congress's relations to the army in re-
gard to war materiel. By war materiel, I mean such items a s arms, artillery, 
gunpowder, and ammunition. Of course, some of the above mentioned pro-
blems will enter this thesis but I hope to study chiefly the difficulties Con-
gress and Washington encountered in arming the Continental Army. 
This thesis covers from the year, 1775, to the capture of Stony Point 
in July, 1779. During those years the Congress found it most difficult to ob-
tain a sufficient number of muskets and amount of powder. However, by the 
year, 1779, the arms' crisis had subsided considerably. Moreover major 
fighting in the North had ended for Washington's army. Most of Congress's 
problems with Washington's army during the last two years of the war were not 
concerned with supplying the army with war materiel but rather with food, 
clothing, and pay. As the war around New York quieted the problem of military 
i 
stores lessened for Congress and Washington. Thus I ended this study of 
Congress I s relations with the army in July, 1779. 
11 
CHAPTER I 
MEN AND NO ARMS 
The firing on Lexington Green, the brief stand at the North Bridge in 
Concord I and the hurried retreat of the redcoats to Boston found the Massachu-
setts Provincials ready for a clash of arms. As the colonists were familiar 
with limited self-government, serious preparation for war had been going on for 
months. Throughout New England the provincial legislatures, although extra-
legal bodies, had organized the militias into effective units, ordered the pro-
curement of arms and ammunition, and appointed Committees of Safety. 
The Committees of Safety carried on and extended the important work of 
the earlier Committees of Correspondence. Many of those on the Committees 
of Safety were merchants and tradesmen. These merchants were shrewd and 
had a talent for thrift that enabled them to supply the colonies with good pro-
visions. Their main task was to train and supply the militias both with men 
and war materiel. If the situation demanded, the Committee of Safety was em-
1 
2 
powered to call out the miliUa. These Committees were aided in obtaining 
arms for the militia by the decrees of the Provincial Congresses: IIIf any of 
the said inhabitants are not provided with arms and ammunition, according to 
law, that they immediately provide themselves there with, and that they use 
their utmost diligence to perfect themselves in military skill. ,,1 
Preparation for war was not a new task for the New England legislatures 
since their miUtias had fought in the French and Indian War. Even the idea of 
minute men was not new for in the middle of the 1750's there had been alarm 
lists of men who were ready to fight the Indians at a moment's notice. The 
militia consisted of the entire body of citizens of military age except clergymen 
paupers, and certain others. Usually the Provincials possessed muskets but 
few of them were marksmen. Muskets were not made for accuracy, powder was 
scarce, and the farmer did not have much time to hunt or practice, contrary to 
tradition. 2 A musket which weighed eleven pounds, was eleven gaugo, and 
stood four feet, nine inches tall without a bayonet, was commonly used in New 
England while the rifle was practically unknown. 3 The militia needed regular 
1 Allen French, The Day of Concord and Lexington, (Boston: Uttle, 
Brown, and Co., 1925), p. 23. 
2Ibid., pp. 255-56. 
3J. W. Wright, II Rifle in the American Revolution, II American Historical 
Review, XXIX, (Jan. 1924), 293-99. 
3 
training if they had any hopes of becoming marksmen. On certain days of the 
year it was a custom that the militia mustered on the town green where the men 
had more of a holiday than a training period. 
However as relations with Great Britain became more tense, the assem-
blies stiffened their militia' s training and some even mustered every week for 
shooting practice. Many of the colonies had company drill once a month, 
regimental drill twice a year, and brigade drill once every two years. 
Connecticut in 1114 could boast of twenty-thousand men in eighteen regiments 
with at least a troop of horses to each regiment. 4 
Through the efforts of the Committees of Safety the Provincial Con-
gresses had created the militia into an army and these "armies" must remain 
their servant. The Congresses and Committees were civilian bodies who were 
determined to control not only the civil affairs of the colonies but also the 
military affairs. These civilians who directed the militias were sensitive to 
any military attitude that challenged their superiority. 5 
The colonists became concerned in September, 1114, when General 
Gage; Commander of the British Forces in America, ordered the gunpowder 
4Willard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms, (New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1951) I p. 3. 
5Allen French, First Year of the American Revolution, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934) p. 49. 
4 
reserve of Massachusetts to be seized. This brought about the "powder 
alarm." Israel Putnam, who had led his Connecticut militia towards Boston, 
returned when he heard that no blood had been shed. However, he did write 
to the Massachusetts Assembly, "We much desire you to keep a strict guard 
over the remainder of your powder; for that must be the great means, under 
God, for the salvation of our country. ,,6 The assemblies soon realized that 
this powder which was scarce was necessary for the protection of their 
rights. With the purchase of military stores and the removal of war materiel 
from royal arsenals, they began their preparations for hostilities. Although 
the colonies were hindered by England's Declaration of non-importation of 
military stores in December of 1774, they decided to try to import gunpowder 
through the blockade. 7 The assemblies also encouraged the colonists to re-
new their own manufacture of war materiel. 
In December, 1774, Rhode Island militia seized cannon and other 
military stores from Fort George at Newport, while New Hampshire men cap-
tured arms and ammunit10n from Fort William and Mary at Portsmouth. The 
6Sit George O. Trevelyan, American Revolution, I, p. 289, cited in 
French, the Day of Concord and Lexinaton, p. 25. 
7peter Force (ed.), American Archives, (9 vols.; Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1843-53), Fourth Serles, II, 276-77. (From now 
on referred to as Force.) 
5 
Governor of New Hampshire requested General Gage to send troops to guard 
the King's stores, but before any help was sent, Paul Revere with 400 men 
had seized 100 barrels of gunpowder, some 11ght cannon, and 60 muskets. 8 
A British captain wrote to his superior officer after these assaults that "They 
(Americans) intend to procure Powder and Ball, and Military Stores of all 
kinds whenever they can get them •••• ,,9 This captain's opinion was correct 
since the New England Assemblies realized that arms and ammunition might 
be the saJvation of the colonies. 
The colonies were destitute of ammunition and what powder was on 
hand had l;een in the colonial stores since the French and Indian War. Most 
of the powder mills were in ruins. So too, muskets were often in poor con-
dition since there seems to have been no more than two hundred gunsmiths 
in the colonies. 1 0 Nevertheless men in the colonies boasted as did one 
Philadelphian to a Member of Parliament in England that the colony of 
Pennsylvania alone could manufacture 100,000 stand of arms and gunpowder 
8JR!sL, IV, I, 1041. 
9 IblsL, IV, I, 1039-40. 
1 o Esmond Wright, . Fabric of Freedom. 1163-1800, (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 196]), p. 128. 
6 
more easily than it could be imported from England .11 The assemblies soon 
realized such statements were merely hopes that seldom became facts. 
The Massachusetts Committee of Safety worked diligently from 
December, 177 .. , into the spring of 1775, in the acquisition of military stores. 
Besides procuring food and mess kits they purchased powder, fuses I grape 
and round shot, cartridge paper, mortars t musket balls, flints, cannons, 
cannon carriages., and entrenching tools .12 Not only did the New England 
Assemblies prepare for war but southern colonies also stiffened the training of 
their militia and purchased whatever war materiel they could. In January, 
1775, a Committee in Virginia resolved that a poll tax should be taken to 
procure a quantity of ammunition which would provide for the "common de-
fense of all. 1.13 George Washington was chairman of that committee. 
Throughout February and March the Massachusetts Assembly en-
couraged the Provincials to produce arms and bayonets by placing a premium 
on those made by a certain date. By early April, 1775, Massachusetts had 
on hand in its arsenals an estimated 21,000 fire arms, 17,000 pounds of 
11 Force, IV, I, 1066. 
12· . ~, IV, I, 1365-70. 
13.IW.:, IV, I, 1145: 
--
7 
lead balls, 22,000 pounds of powder, and 10,000 bayonets.14 And yet 
munitions were never adequate especially in the first years of the war. 
Scarcity of --gunpowder and cartridge paper foroed the Provinoials to carry 
fewer rounds of ammunition than did the British Regulars during most of the 
war. 
Although the Committees of Safety obtained war materiel and the 
militia oontinued to train, little practical thought was given to what would 
happen onoe actual war began. No strategy was planned and no ooordination 
of the militia under one command was considered. In the spring of 1775, 
most of the people thought only of their farms and trade and perhaps relied 
instinotively on the known humanity of the British Government. 15 On 
April 19, 1775, actual fighting ocoUlTed at Lexington and Conoord whioh 
a wakened the Americans to their crisis. As the news of war raoed through 
the oolonies the Provinoial Militia of New Hampsh!re, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island hastened to Boston to aid their sister provinoe. 
The quiokness in the assembling of the miliUa amazed both the 
oolonists and the British. Never had there been anything like it • With the 
14L1nooln (ed.), Ioumal of Each ProVincial Congress, p. 756 oited in 
C. K. Bolton, The hiyat! Soldier Under Washington, (New York: Charles 
Soribner's Sons, 1902), p. 105. 
15Frenoh, Th! Day of Concgrd and Lexington, pp. 81-83. 
8 
men pouring in, all parts of New England seemed to have been represented. 
Most of the militia can-ied their own muskets, a number of rounds of am-
munition, and a little food which their wives had hurriedly gathered. All the 
clothes they had were on their backs. Patriotism was never stronger as they 
encamped around Boston. This mass of militia, almost a mob, had to be 
welded together into an army which would be properly fed, armed, and paid. 
These troops set the pace for the colonies who responded with pleas 
for men, arms, and ammunition. Massachusetts authorized 13,600 troops to 
be raised, while Connecticut set its quota at 6,000 men, and a force of 
2,000 was summoned by New Hampshire. 16 Artemis Ward was appointed 
General of all the American Forces in front of Boston and those who were 
soon to arrive. 
In May, 1115, there was about 80,000 pounds of gunpowder in the 
. colonies. Georoia who had recently seized 12,100 pounds of powder from a 
British vessel in Savannah Harbor forwarded most of it to Boston. Massachu-
setts had stored up 12,000 pounds, Connecticut had 4,000, New Hampshire 
had 5,000 pounds, Pennsylvania and Maryland each possessed 4,000 pounds 
16wallace, OPe cit., p. 21. 
9 
and little Rhode Island had massed 17 ,000 pounds of powder .17 Although 
New York and New Jersey possessed very little powder f the colonies had ef-
ficiently performed their task of preparing for war. However I these provi-
sions were far from sufficient for embarking on a prolonged struggle. There 
was still great need of arms, bayonets, flints, tents, blankets, and 
clothing which the Committee of safety found more difficult to obtain as the 
conflict approached. 
By June, 1775, army life was already becoming dull with the in-
activity of a siege and difficult with the shortage of rations. Soon the 
troops began to grumble because of the lack of food and liquor; rum was as 
essential to the army then as coffee is today. Their supply of powder and 
arms continually dwindled so that by late summer there were 2,000 troops in 
front of Boston without muskets and very low in powder. IS Many of the Pro-
vincials feared that the war would collapse if not because of the shortage of 
arms, certainly because of the lack of gunpowder. 
The Massachusetts Assembly continued in its attempts to procure 
arms. On May 2 I 1775, it ordered 200 weight of lead balls and 200 pounds 
17 Orlando W. Stephenson, "Supply of Gunpowder in 1116." American 
Historical Review, XXX, (Jan. 1925), 271-S1. 
181000 C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom« 111 5-S 3, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1945), j>. 103. 
10 
of powder and 1,000 flints .19 It further hoped that the artillery from Fort 
Ticonderoga could soon be seized by Benedict Arnold and sent to Boston. The 
individual Committees of Safety supported the military arm of the Provincial 
Assemblies but they did not intend the militia to become too strong too soon 
because of their traditional dread of the military spirit. Civilian leaders 
were more concerned about conserving their war materiel than expending it 
to win their rights. These civilian leaders feared the army's rise to power 
as they recalled the Caesars and Cromwells?ho had become dlctators. Al-
though in Massachusetts there seemed to be little unwillingness to support 
its militia, there was an incident that demonstrated the friction between the 
civil and military power. 
Artemis Ward, General of all the assembled militia, ordered the 
Committee of Safety to deliver the muskets which had been collected (with 
great difficulty) by the Massachusetts Assembly. The Committee promptly 
made it known to Ward that he was not empowered lito order them" but could 
only order his officers. Only after the Committee had read a lecture to the 
General on his military powers, did it deliver the fire arms to the militia. 20 
19lbrce , IV, II, 750-51 
2°French, IJ.ut Year of the Ameriqan Revoluticm., p. 267, and Force, 
IV, II, 676. 
11 
The politicians and legislators who were sensitive to any trespassing on 
their "supreme rights" were quick to keep the army in its proper place. This 
same feeling would soon be displayed by the Second Continental Congress 
which was to meet in Philadelphia. 
The war with England had begun and the colonies in New England had 
put an army into the field, but an organized army with an effic.tent system of 
war supplied was still greatly needed. The Second Continental Congress had 
a tremendous task before them; to agree on a Nar policy, to provide and 
maintain a well-equiped army that could stand up to the British Regulars, and 
to determine on a common goal that would satisfy and unify all the colonies. 
The assembled militia looked to Philadelphia and its civilian leaders for 
direction. 
pst . 
CHAPTER II 
THE PEN DIRECTS THE SWORD 
The Second Continental Congress convened on May 10, 1775, in 
Philadelphia. Most of the members of Congress were in their early forties 
or younger. Motivated by the new human philosophy of Locke and Rousseau, 
their enthusiasm gave them confidence and optimism in their new developing 
land. From the upper class of colonial society many of the members came to 
represent their colonies. Educated and influential men like Washington, Han-
cock, John Adams I Duane, Rutledge ,Franklin, Sam Adams, and Dickinson 
were present, and in the near future Jefferson, Gouverneur Morris, carroll, 
Jay, and Henry Laurens would meet in Congress. These were the 'Irebels," 
enthusiastic, wealthy, and talented, who met to challenge the British 
21 Empire. 
This Congress was not like the first which had met in September, 
1774. This Congress was not to be a mere advisory council. Instead, the 
21Miller, OPt cit., pp. 21-2'1'2 
13 
Second Continental Congress realized the critical situation and decided to 
assume the character of a governing body. Many problems had to be con-
sidered by these forty-eight Congressmen in Philadelphia. 22 Most of the 
delegates were commissioned by their home governments to consider two 
issues; the defense of American rIghts and possible reconciliation with 
Great Britain. With New England fighting Britain, these representatives had 
to decide if this war belonged to all the colonies. Some men wanted to 
petition King George III that he might clearly understand their grievances 
while others like John Adams felt the time for petitions was past. "Powder 
and artillery are the most efficacious, sure and infallible conCiliatory meas-
ures we can adopt, " declared Adams. 2 3 
Congress quickly agreed that measures of defense should be taken by 
all the colonies because they thought what Britain would do to one colony it 
could do to all of them. On June 10, 1775, Congress called upon the 
colonies: 
That it be, and is hereby earnestly recommended to the 
several Colonies of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and Massachusetts, that they immediately furnish the 
22 Washington C. Ford (ed.), Journals of the Continental Congress, 
(34 vols.; Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1904-37), II, 
11-12. (From now on referred to as Journal.) 
23 Wright, 0;. 91t., p. 91. 
14 
American army before Boston with a s much powder out of their 
town, and other public stocks as they can possibly spare; 
keeping an exact account of the quantities supplied, that it 
may again be replaced, or paid by the Contin!~t; this to. be ef-
fected with the utmost secrecy and dispatch. 
Although they attempted to establish an adequate defense of the colonies, the 
Congressmen could only recommend that their state assemblies act on the sug-
gest10ns of Congress. Also many of the Congressmen thought the possibility 
of reconciliation must remain open which was one reason for keeping their 
actions secret. 
The colonial legislatures responded to the advice of Congress. 
Virginia i S House of Burgesses took stock of their arms, many of which had no 
locks or were so old that they were useless. They resolved in mid June to 
acquire arms for "protection :)f the colony against Indian wars or slave insur-
rections " so as not to arouse the suspicion of the royal governor. 25 So too 
the Connecticut and Pennsylvania Assemblies encouraged the manufacture of 
gunpowder by placing a premium on making saltpetre from materials that could 
easily be obtained in the colonies. l'hese assemblies even specified the size 
of muskets and fir8locks to be made. 26 The Massachusetts Assembly not 
26Ibid., IV, II, 563, 1172-73. 
as 
15 
only accepted Congress's advice to procure powder but voluntarily put it-
self under the control of the Continental Congress, by asking if Massachu-
setts could form a state government. This was a precedent since the powers 
of this Continental Congress were still uncertain. Massachusetts stated that 
they wanted to form a civil government since there was a vast army of militia 
in their colony that had no legal civil authority to provide for them or to 
govern them. 27 later in the summer Congress consented to Massachusetts' 
request for a civil government. During 1775 and throughout the war New 
England continued to fear the threat of military power. 
The Continental Congress itself feared the thought of military power. 
In early June it undertook the organization and direction of the army often 
without any military knowleage. Congress drew up sixty-nine articles for 
the army which dealt mostly with discipline. 28 As the war progressed the 
inability of Congress to provide for the war effort became apparent and not 
on a few occasions dangerous. In Congress there were no professIonal 
soldiers but Congress felt the need to control all military matters. 
O~ the Congressmen Washington was one of the few who had been an 
officer in any war. John Adams nominated Washington for Commander-in-
27Journal I II, 75-76. 
28Journal., II, 111-23. 
16 
Chief of the American Forces and Sam Adams seconded the motion. Politics 
and sectionalism had their influence on this military decision and indeed 
would continue to plague all military operations. Congress, more especially 
the New Englanders, hoped to insure Southern support in the war effort by the 
appointment of a Virginia commander. John Adams strongly favored this ap-
pointment and wrote to his wife, Abigail, when Congress appointed'/vashing-
ton Commander-in-Chief. 
This apPOintment will have a great effect in cementing and 
securing the union of these colonies •.. I hope the people of 
our province will treat the general with all that confidence and 
affection, that politeness and respect, which is due to one of 
the most important characters in the world. The liberties of 
America depend upon him, in a great degree. 2 9 
In Washington Congress found more than a mere soldier. The General 
of the American Forces would have to deal with the colonial governments as 
well as with Congress. Often he had to decide poliCies and manage men who 
were jealous of their position and special privileges. A general was needed 
who could meet the various situations, who could yield as well as insist, 
and who could concede lesser points in order to gain greater ones. 30 Wash-
29 Edmund C. Burnett, (ed.), Letters of Members of the Continental 
Congress. 1774-89, (8 vols.: Washington, D.C.: carnegie Institution of 
Nashington, 1921-36), I, 130-31. (From now on referred to as Letters.) 
30 French , The First Year of the Ameriqan Revolution, p. 484. 
17 
ington accepted the appointment and promised to carry out Congressional or-
den. He certainly proved to be their faithful servant. His task was to unite 
the existing army and to create an effective fighting force through discipline 
and training. 
On June 17, the Battle of Bunker Hill was fought, a costly victory for 
the British Army. Already the lack of powder was felt by the American $oldiem 
who had expended most of their cartridges during the battle. 31 John Adams 
became an'Jry with Congress because he thought it was to blame for this de-
feat. He wrote Abigail that Congress had prevented every plan that might 
have put the army in readiness for this attack. Further he bemoaned the de-
lay, jealousy, and timidity that he witnessed in Congress. 32 
Although Hancock, President of the Congress, continued to send re-
quests to the colonies for war materiel, the members of Congress debated 
whether the manufacture of powder was not primarily within the prerogative 
of the state rather than within that of Congress. Such wrangling tired Adams, 
Washington, and the military officers since they were concerned with ob-
taining the gunpowder, not with the one who produced it. 
31 Wallace, op. cit., p. 44. 
32Catherine D. Bowen, John A4ams and the American Revolution. 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950), p. 536. 
-18 
On July 3, 1775, Washington assumed command of the Continental 
Army at cambridge. From his first reports to Congress, the General made 
clear that his task was difficult. Not only were discipline and order needed 
but military supplies were most in demand. 'Ji.,'lthout these supplies he could 
not hope to put a well-ordered army in the field. Gunpowder was often 
wasted by the militia who would hunt, or fire at an imaginary enemy I or 
simply shoot their muskets for enj oyment. To conserve powder General 
Nashington issued strict orders against such violators but these orders went 
unheeded throughout the summer. In early August 'lvashington issued a 
General Order to the army: "It is with indignation and shame the General ob-
serves that not Withstanding the repeated orders which have been given to 
prevent the firing of guns in and about camp, that it is daily and hourly prac-
ticed." Further he admonished them that it did no harm to the enemy I wasted 
precious ammunition, disturbed the camp, and added to the difficulty of 
knowing a real alarm from a false one. vVashington declared that violators 
would be subjected to a court martial. 33 
Powder was expended in such a reckless fashion that by early August 
there was not enough to furnish the troops with one-half pound each. In June 
33French. Tj1e First Year of the American Revolution, p. 469. 
19 
the militia had about 40,000 pounds of powder on hand but as reports of the 
colonial stock of powder arrived on Washington's desk, he became very 
alarmed. 34 With less than 10, 000 pounds, or a reserve of not more than nine 
rounds per soldier in August, Washington was expected to lay siege to 
Boston. 35 The General ,Vfote to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut on August 
14, 1775: 
Upon the subject of powder I am at a loss what to say. Our 
necessities are so great, and it is of such importance that 
this Army should have a full supply that nothing but the most 
urgent and pressing exigence would make it proper to detain 
any on its way. 36 
Throughout these months v'v'ashington wrote to the colonial governors as well 
as to the Continental Congress. He soon learned that the colonies willingly 
would equip their own militia but not the Continental Army. 
The shortage of ammunition was so critical that the firing of the 
morning and evening cannon was eliminated and the artillery was not to re-
turn British fire. Only one small nine-pounder was occasionally fired from a 
vantage pOint on Prospect Hill. 36 A quarter of the army was :without fire 
arms which led the officers to fear that the army was becoming useless. 
34 Stephenson, op. cit., p. 273. 
35Force, IV, nI, 5. 
36 Ibid. I IV, III, 137. 
20 
General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island wrote in a letter: "Oh, that we had 
plenty of powder; I should then hope to see something done here for the honor 
of America ... 37 In front of Boston there was an army but it was paralyzed be-
cause of the lack of arms, artillery, and gunpowder. 
Benjamin Franklin, when he heard of the scarcity of arms, suggested 
to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety that pikes be used by the two rear 
ranks of the army. Artemis Ward had also recommended that Congress order 
the manufacture of spears to defend the American fortifications. Washington 
himself approved of spears as long as they were sturdy and thirteen feet 
long. 38 Pikes and spears were not only manufactured in quantity but ac-
tually used with good effect throughout the war. 39 The General's letters to 
Congress continually requested war materiel. On August 20, 1775, Washing-
ton received 61 1/2 tons of powder from the South. With this arrival he felt 
reasonably safe against any attack, but he never had enough to allow an 
artillery engagement or an infantry attack on the British. 40 It is amazing that 
37Ibid ., IV, IV, 312. 
38Ibid., IV I n, 1424-25. 
39Lynn Montross, Rag, Tag, and Bobtail, (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1952) I p. 42. 
4°French, The First Year of the American Revolution, p. 488. 
p. 
21 
General Gage never realized the plight of the American Army. Elias Boudinot 
recounts an interesting explanation for Gage's ignorance. 
Boudinotstated that a deserter from the Continental Army had gone to 
Gage and reported the tremendous shortage of arms and powder in the Ameri-
can camp. 
The fact was so incredible that General Gage treated it as a 
strategem of war and the informant as a SPYi or coming with 
the express purpose of deceiving him and dra"Ning his army 
into a snare by whi<?/l means we were saved from having our 
quarters beaten up. 
Congress occasionally acted like Gage in that they could not believe that the 
army was destitute of arms and powder. 
i!v'ashlngtol1' s frequent reports were read in Congress but supplying 
the army was only one of their pressing problems. In the summer of 1775, 
finance, national and international diplomacy ~ and the question of indepen-
dence or reconciliation were all discussed in Philadelphia. Several days after 
vVashington had assumed command of the Continental Army, Congress approve 
a Declaration on Taking Arms . 
. . . We are reduced to the alternative of chusing (sic) an un-
conditional submission to the tyranny of irritated ministers or 
resistance by force - the latter is our choice ... Our cause is 
41£11as Boudinot, TournaI, (Philadelphia: Frederick Bourquin, 1894), 
pp. 71-72. 
22 
just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are great, 
and, if necessary, foreign assistance is undoubtedly at-
tainable ... Lest this declaration should disquiet the minds of 
our friends and fellow-subjects in any part of the empire, we 
assure them that we mean not to dissolve that Union which 
has so long and so happily subsisted between us, and which 
we sincerely wish to see restored. 42 
This Declaration demonstrates the dualism they encountered in trying to keep 
the way open for reconciliation with Britain while at the same time they were 
forced to prepare for war. Two days after this Declaration Congress com-
posed and sent a petition to the King which stated their grievances and 
hopes for reconciliation. Usually the army suffered most because of Con-
gress's indecision and half commitment to war. Often discussion and debate 
dragged urgent matters out for several weeks. Congressional work was long 
and tedious since matters of military stores were frequently delegated to a 
committee of congressmen for discussion and evaluation. After their conside 
ation the major pOints were presented to the whole Congress who then 
resolved to appoint either another committee to obtain the war materiel or 
merely to recommend the matter to a particular state assembly where more 
committees would probably discuss the original request for military stores. 
Washington wrote to Congress on August 4, 1775: 
42Iqyrnal, II, 153-57. 
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I need not enlarge on our melancholy situation; it is suf-
ficient, that the existence of the Army, and the salvation of 
the Country depend on something being done for our relief, 
both speedy and effectual, and that our situation be kept a 
profound secret. 43 
This letter was read to Congress on September 1, and certainly was not acted 
on until later in the month. Such delay hindered Washington's organization 
of the army. This condition was not unique to the first months of the Congres 
since 10s.eph Hewes of North Carolina wrote a year later: 
Much of our time is employed in raising men, making cannon, 
muskets, and merely finding out ways and means of supplying 
our troops ... We resolve to make and import muskets, powder, 
etc. but it is a melancholy fact that near half of our men, 
cannon l musket, powder I etc. is to be found nowhere but on 
paper. 44 
However many of the members of Congress were concerned for the 
army and realized that confusion over the proper direction of the army existed. 
Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, in a letter to General Washington, showed a 
real concern for the army's need of supplies. On July 21, 1775, Harrison 
made this observation: 
Your fatigue and various kinds of trouble I dare say are great, 
but they are not more than I expected, knowing the people you 
----------------.--------------------------------------------------
43Force, IV, III, 29. 
44Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental C9ngress « (New York: The 
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have to deal with by the sample we have here ... Everything 
that we can do here to put you in the best posture possible I 
think you may depend on it. 45 
V{ashington was encouraged by such remarks and continued to place his 
trust in Congress I s direction of the army. 
On July 15, Congress ordered the state to lift the embargo of Great 
Britain \lv'hich had forbade the importation of arms into America. This VIlas the 
result of long debates between Congressmen who wanted independence and 
those who desired reconciHation. The greatest pressure for opening the 
ports and attempting an American foreign diplomacy came from the army. \'Var 
materiel was a necessity and only foreign merchants and foreign ports could 
provide it. 46 
Since trade was permitted with any nation that \!'lOuld supply arms and 
powder in exchange for produce I Congress appropriated large sums of money 
for the importation of military stores. On July 27, Congress re~olved that 
$25,000 be spent for importing gunpov/der. 47 Shipmasters receiv(~d licenses 
only on the condition that they would returnvvith war materiel. Nith this 
45 Letters, I, 169. 
46 Curtis P. Nettels, George Wa shlngton and American Independence, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951) I pp. 226-28. 
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dispensation American ships looked to Europe, Mrlca, and the 'Nest Indies 
for arms and powder. 4 8 In September, 1775, Congre s s created a Secret Com-
mittee of seven Congressmen, most of whom were merchants, to supervise 
the exports and imports of these important items. 
From its first days Congress had encouraged the purchase of saltpetre 
which could then be manufactured into gunpowder. Conqress offered to take 
twelve month contracts with powder manufacturers and stated that such an oc-
cupation wa13 an honorable service to their country. 49 JUthough American 
manufacturing was generally insufficient to the demands of war, powder mills 
began to be constructed. In Pennsyl vClnia there were six pC'wder mills which 
produced several thousand pounds of gunpowder a week which allowed the 
Pennsylvania Committee of Safety to report to Congress In August that they 
had a reserve of 2245 pounds of powder. 50 
Congress sent letters to the colonies with information on the different 
processes of manufacturing pI)lfvder in hope that they would imitate Pennsyl-
vania. From late August and into the winter the state assemblies continued 
to respond to Congress I s petition for arms and powder. Maryland resolved to 
48Ibid., II, 184-85. 
49~, III, 345. 
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purchase 200 barrels of powder plus other military stores while New York 
contracted for 15 tons of powder and 1400 stands of arms. 51 Pennsylvania 
promised to send two tons of powder to Washington's camp: Massachusetts 
resolved to purchase 30 tons of sulphur; North Carolina ordered the manufac-
ture of saltpetre and the purchase of 550 pounds of powder, and Virginia re-
solved to pay 100 to promote the production of saltpetre. 52 New York even 
ordered all arms found 1n the custody of those who did not pledge allegiance 
to the Colony to be impressed. 53 Thus the assemblies cooperated with the 
Continental Congress 1n procuring war materiel. However it is almost im-
possible to ascertain how many of these resolutions were really acted upon 
and what percentage of the milita.."'Y stores ever reached Washington's army. 
On August 1, 1775, when Congress adjourned, most of the members 
set out to visit the camp at Boston instead of directly departing for their homea 
Congress and the army worked very closely but at times too closely fOl' an 
efficient administration of the army. General Washington knew many of the 
Congressmen and could rely on their support, but as the war progressed and 
new faces came to Congress Washington heSitated to rely on Congressional 
51Force, W, UI, 104. 
52 BWL." w, m, 859, 1510,209, IV, IV, 80. 
53DWL , IV, IU, 898. 
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judgment. Some of the most talented men participated in this Congress but 
Congress was an experiment in self government for the united colonies and 
many mistakes would be made before an efficient system of government de-
veloped. 
These men like the Provincial Congressmen saw no need for too 
strong an army, especially as they were not yet committed to an all-out war 
for independence. Congress protected its powers lest they slip into the 
hands of the army. As a result seldom did Congress allow officers to be ap-
pointed by the general in the field. But in July, 1775, Congress left most of 
the minor appointments to Washington's decisIon which displeased John 
Adams. He thought the officers should be made dependent on the Congress 
and not on their general for their commissions because each officer should be 
a check on the general and he a check upon them. Granting this power to 
Washington was unusual Since more often Congress reserved this privUege to 
itself. Because of this practice many officers tried to please the Congress-
men who seldom knew anything about the officer's conduct in the field. 54 
This custom prevented the General from improving the organization of his 
army. 
54 Miller, OR. cit! ,p. 240. 
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Washington was sensitive of this manifestation of Congress's 
jealous fear and on occasion the General reminded them that he was a citizen-
soldier. On August 1, 1775 Washington was informed by Richard H. Lee of 
Virginia that Congress tried to make tlhis arduous business as easy as the 
nature of things would admit ... 55 Washington respected Congress and yet he 
was frequently uninformed of important matters that were discussed in Con-
gress .56 The General desired the authority of Congress to be strong in order 
to keep the Continental Army together. Without a strong centralized govem-
ment 'Washington thought the state assemblies with their own provincial in-
terests and varied demands would destroy the army. The general never 
wanted his authority to be greater than the Congress and he strove to co-
operate with Congress. He was aware of their dignity and prestige and he 
manifested to Congress a respectful subordination. 57 
As the militia enlistments expired Washington had to order that no 
soldier was to carry away his musket if it was fit for use. Although muskets 
55Force, IV, IU, 1. 
56John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writinqs of G!ome Wasbinqtsm ' 
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were appraised and purchased, .nany soldiers took their leave with their 
arms because they considered it their reward for service. 58 Thus Washington 
had to order that "Jf any Man attempts to carry off a single Grain of Ammuni-
tion not known to be his own I he will be pursued I brought back and se17erely 
punished. ,,59 Throughout the fall and winter the army remained in need of 
powder and arms. Between July 1,1775 and January 31,1776, Washington 
received a total of 443 barrels of powder. 60 Although this shipment could not 
adequately supply the army, the General was pleased and wrote his brother, 
John I in October: 
I am also pleased to find that the manufacture of arms and 
ammunition has been attended to with so much care. A plenty 
of these and unanimity and fortitude among ourselves must de-
feat every attempt that the lfnistry (English) can invent to en-
slave this great continent. 
Throughout the winter months powder vanished as fast as it arrived. Con-
stantly Washington feared that the British Army might make an attack upon 
his poorly equipped army. 
58Bolton, OJ? cit., p. 113. 
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As the powder shortage ,vas so great the army's artillery was prac-
tically useless, but artillery was necessary if Boston was to be recaptured 
by the Continentals. Congress found it most difficult to procure any cannon. 
However Washington decided. to send General Knox to Fort Ticonderoga to 
bring some cannon back to Cambridge. Certainly for the present Washington 
could not employ more artillery but he hoped the time would come when he 
could use all his cannons. On Christmas Day the General complained to 
Joseph Reed 1n a letter, "Our want of powder is too inconceivable. A dally 
waste and no supply administers a gloomy prospect. ,,62 
Although powder and arms were scarce and the situation seemed 
critical, food was fairly plentiful around Boston. Thus with food rather than 
with fire arms Washington kept the British Army locked up in Boston that 
winter. 63 
When Congress reconvened in September, 1775, it continued its de-
bates over the purchase of military supplies. Some of the members who still 
favored reconclliatton were opposed to purchasing large amounts of milItary 
~2Ste!,henCl'f)n, op. cit q p. 274, quoting Sparks (ed.) Letters of 
Washinaton, III, 215. 
63wallace, oR. cit" p. 56. 
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stores while others like Duane remarked, "We must have powder; I would 
send for powder to London or anywhere. \Ve are undone if we have not 
powder. ,,64 Delay was inevitable during these debates but it seldom seemed 
to worry the Congressmen. In some of the debates sectionalism was evident 
as Congress argued what colony should get a certain contract and what price 
that colony should be paid by the united colonies. 65 On occasion Congress 
was embarrassed by having to compete with states in the purchase of private 
cargoes of arms. Also there were always profiteers who did as much damage 
to the army and Congress as any British force. 
On September 29, 1175, Congress appOinted a committee of three of 
their own members to visit the army camp at cambridge in order to plan the 
most effectual method to continue to support and regulate the Continental 
Army. The instructions approved by Congress for this committee reflected 
their own ignorance of military affairs. The Committee was supposed to 1n-
form Washington of Congress's hopes for an attack on Boston in the near 
future. 66 After ten days of consultation with the General the Committee re-
turned to report to Congress on November 2, 1115. In their report methods of 
64Iournal, III, 484. 
65llUsL, m, 413-79. 
66 . IO\U'Illl, III, 265. 
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supply, the size of the army, pay of officers I and the discipline of the army 
were discussed, but no mention of any attack in the near future. 67 After 
Congress heard the report they discussed most of the issues which were 
slowly approved in conformity with Washington t swishes. 
However, Sam Adams voiced his fear of the possibility of is military 
dictator if the "general's army" became too independent of Congress for its 
needs. Sam Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts that the Con-
tinental Army must be under the direction of Congress and the military power 
of the colonies should remain under the direction of the individual state as-
semblies unless Congress should demand such authority. Gerry was essen-
tiaUy in agreement with Adams in his reply: 
vVe already see the growing thirst for power in some of the 
inferior departments of the army, which ought to be regulated 
so far as to keep the military entirely subservient to the civil 
in every part of the United Colonies. 68 
In late October, 1775, Adams still felt that military power "has so often 
proved fatal to the liberties of mankind" that unless the militia became the 
backbone of resistance to England, the ColOnies were in danger of losing 
67 !l21sL, ,W, 321. 
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their liberties to some aspiring general wearing the Continental Army's 
uniform. 69 
A letter similar to Adams' viewpoint bad appeared earlier in PhUadel-
phia under the title I 9aractacus on Standing Armies. "Beware of standing 
armies ••• a knowledge of the use of arms is the only condition of freedom •••• 
The Romans conquered the world in the Republican times with armies of unpaid 
militia. ,,70 Some members of Congress really distrusted the power of the 
Continental Army as a standing army because it was paid while others realized 
that the militia alone could accomplish very little Fortunately there were 
enough Congressmen who supported Washington's opinion that the army must 
be well supplied and paid. Although division of feelings remained in Congres~ 
Lynch I who was a committeeman that had been sent to Washington, wrote to 
the General on November 13, 1775: "I am happy to inform you that Congress 
has agreed to every recommendation of the committee. It 71 
Congress was not opposed to the army but a number of Congressmen 
feared the army or simply tried to oversee too many military operations. There 
69John C. Miller I Sam Adams, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. I 1936), 
p. 344, quoting Writings of Sam Acitms I III, 230. 
70Force, IV, III, 219-20. 
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was gradually less talk of reconciliation as Ward of Rhode Island wrote to his 
brother in the middle of October, 1775: "In a word all hopes of a speedy re-
conciliation are over, and we unanimously determine to push the war with the 
greatest vigour. 1.72 Congress was still far from any decision to break com-
pletely with Britain in a declaration of independence, but with less talk of 
reconciliation Congress would attend to the war effort more energetically. 
Congress continued to be slow to delegate any of its authority to military per-
sonnel. It also would try to control both the civil and military affairs of the 
United Colonies. Thus the shortage of war materiel would continue partly 
because of Congress t s own incompetence to administer both the army and its 
own legislative body efficiently. 
The deficiency in arms and powder was so acute that Washington was 
prompted to begin his own negotiations to acquire such military stores. On 
three occasions the General had wanted to attack Boston but his council of 
war opposed him because of the powder shortage and the troops' lack of ex-
pedence . 73 By the end of 1775, French merchants had arrived in America and 
had gone to Congress with their proposals for selling war materiel. 14 By 
72Burnett, op. cit., pp. 115-16. 
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November the troops had only five rounds of powder a piece and the artillery 
was silenced while Washington was forced to wait and hope. 
The depression was somewhat lifted when news came that a Captain 
Manly, a privateer, had captured a British brig, the Nancy, in late November, 
1775. The ship's cargo contained 2,000 muskets, 100,000 flints, over 30 
tons of musket shot I 30,000 round shot I and a brass mortar which the soldiers 
later named '1 Congress. ,,75 By January, 1776 part of this shipment of military 
stores had reached Washington, and Colonel Henry Knox arrived at Cambridge 
in February with the much needed artillery of Fort Ticonderoga. During 
February Washington had to dismiss militia who reported for service without 
arms, and frequently soldiers would go out on the ice in front of their camp to 
pick up spent balls that the British troops had fired at them. 76 Stephen 
Moylan, an aide to Washington, wrote at this time: 'IIf we had powder I do 
believe Boston would fall into our hands ... 77 The situation was stUI critical 
when Washington informed Congress of the state of his supplies on February 
18, 17i6: 
7 5Dr. James Thacher, MilitarY TournaI During the American Revolu-
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This, sir I Congress may be assured is a true state of 
powder (between 60 and 1000 barrels) I and will, I hope I 
bear some testimony of my incapacity for action in such 
way as may do any essential service. 78 
By the end of February, however, powder and arms were arriving at 
the camp especially from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 79 
In late February Washington thanked Governor Trumbull of Connecticut for gun-
powder from his reserve, and in early March the General thanked Joseph Reed 
for his efforts in Congress to obtain arms. In the letter Washington remarked, 
"I feel too sensibly the mortification of having them (arms) withheld from me; 
Congress not even thinking 1t necessary to take the least notice of myapplica-
tion for these things. ,,80 Washington's patience often helped him to overlook 
these slights but that he did feel them is revealed in that letter to Reed. On 
the twenty-ninth of February three tons of powder arrived at New York and 
three more were expected. Most of this powder went directly to Washington' s 
army.81 Somehow General Gage never did learn of the true state of affairs in 
the American camp and in March the Continental Army's artillery bore down on 
78 Force, IV , IV, 1193 
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the British troops . Washington made good use of his artillery in front of 
Boston, but throughout the war American artillery was inferior to the British. 
Washington and his officers felt confident enough to attack the British forces 
but poor weather intervened and on March 17, 1776, the British evacuated 
Boston. In their great haste the British left great piles of shot I shells, and 
other munitions. Even the cannon had been spiked so poorly that many of them 
were restored to usefulness. 82 Washington and Congress for the first time 
in months could be proud of the army. 'ntis army of half-trained provinCials 
had withstood its first test against the British Regulars as well as it withstood 
Congress's ineffiCient system of supplies There were still many more tests 
to be encountered both by the army and Congress. 
82 Montross, oR. cit., p < 89. 
CHAPTER III 
CONGRESS AND THE DIClATORSHIP 
Throughout the new year of 1776 , Congress continued to try to purchas 
war materiel. John Hancock I President of the Congress, requested several 
state assemblies to make an estimate of available arms and powder in their 
military stores. Whatever war materiel the states could procure Hancock 
thought should be furthered to the Continental Army. Thomas Lynch of South 
Carolina mentioned in a letter to WashIngton that Congress had ordered fifteen 
tons of powder from New York, and that there was enough saltpetre in Phila-
delphia to produce another eighty tons of gunpowder. 83 In January Congress 
was informed that only 462 quarter casks of powder had been imported which 
was hardly sufficient since Congress supplied powder to individual colonies 
in need, the army in Canada I and privateers, as well as the Continental 
Army.84 
83Letter! ' I, 314. 
84Force, IV, IV, 1645. 
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John Adams wrote James Warren to encourage Massachusetts to pro-
duce powder from saltpetre since it had worked so well in New York I Maryland, 
and Pennsylvania. 85 By the end of March 1776, most of the colonies had pro-
vided legislation for the erection of both public and private saltpetre works 
which benefitted the state militias and the Continental Army. The state as-
semblies tried to cooperate with Congress in obtaining military supplies. The 
Committees of Safety made contracts with local gunsmiths and blacksmiths to 
produce muskets and bayonets. On February 23, Congress created a commit-
tee of five Congressmen to make contracts and to consider ways and means 
"of promoting and encouraging the manufacture of Fire-Arms in all parts of the 
Colonie s . 1.86 
It was futile to hope that most of the arms and powder could be pro-
duced within the colonies. As the colonies were chiefly agricultural they were 
not prepared for a long war and were forced to look abroad for most of their 
military stores. The values in supplies is seen in the contracts these Com-
mittees of Safety made with the privateers. At the beginning of the year 1776, 
a Maryland Committee wrote to Captain Forsythe: 
85!tWL, N, IV, 1141. 
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The money arising from the sales, you must layout in gunpow-
der I if you can get it, if not, muskets fitted with good 
bayonets I and if they are not to be had, saltpetre and sulphur, 
and if you cannot get those articles, then layout the whole in 
strong coarse linen. 87 
On March 3, 1776 the Congressional Committee of Secret Correspondence 
wrote to Silas Deane who was in France that they hoped he could acquire 
"arms for 25,000 men, suitable quantity of ammunition, and 100 field 
pieces ... 88 Although Congress worked to procure arms for their military arm I 
frequently they wasted too much effort and time in lengthy discussions and 
mismanagement. Early 1n March Hancock informed Washington that the impor-
tatton of war materiel was so dangerous that Congress had appointed a com-
mittee to contract only with colonial gunsmiths for the purchase of arms. The 
letter concluded: 
I flatter myself we shall soon be able to provide ourselves 
without risk or danger. Because we must, like other States en-
gaged in the like glorious struggle contend with difficulties. 
By persevereance, and the blessing of God I I trust, if we con-
tinue to deserve freedom; we shall be enabled to overcome 
them. 89 
Had not military stores comes from abroad it is doubtful if the colonies would 
87 Ibid., IV I IV I 771. 
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ever have won their freedom. The colonies certainly did not become self-
sufficient in the matter of war matedel. 
When news of the evacuation of Boston reached Congress they were 
too busy to really appreciate the event. Joseph Hewes on March 20, 1116 
wrote of Congress: 
We do not treat each other with that decency and respect that 
was observed before. Jealousies I ill natured observations and 
recriminations take the place of reason and argument. Our 
tempers are soured. Some among us urge strongly for indepen-
dence and eternal separation, others wish to wait a little 
longer a~~ to have the opinion of their constituents on that 
subject. 
The members of Congress began to irritate one another. Congressmen were 
swamped with work and had little time for rest. Although committee meeting s 
often began early in the morning and continued late into the night, they were 
a1 ways behind in their work, no matter how long or how hard they labored. 
The health of some Congressmen broke down under the strain. lohn Adams 
wrote that the management "of so complicated and mighty a machine as the 
United Colonies requires the meekness of Moses, the patience of Job and the 
wisdom of Solomon, added to the valor of David ... 91 There were simply too 
90Burnett, 0D' cit., p. 141. 
91 Page Smith, lohn Adams I (2 vols.: New York: Doubleday and Co. , 
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many tasks, too many committees, and not enough representatives. 
During the winter months only twelve or fifteen members were present 
but with the spring more members would attend. For some, this was a way to 
preserve their health. Much of the work they left behind secretaries could 
have done but Congress relied only on its own members. No wonder such a 
body of men could not properly supply and direct an army of 14,000 under 
General Washington. They were not willing to make matters easier for them-
selves by assigning to Washington more authority. Even in the midst of their 
important discussions on independence and a possible declaration Congress 
held on to the power to control all military deCisions. It seems that they were 
Just too distrustful of the army to surrender any of their own powers. 
However, one of the most conspicuous failures of the Congress during 
the war was their inefficiency in organizing and supplying the army. Dif-
ferent factors contribute to this failure. Congress I s distrust of the army and 
their ignorance at military operations, the frequent change of Congressional 
personnel, and the lack of any strong centralization of authority all added to 
the distress and confusion of the army. Officers and soldiers complained 
about the civilian interference of Congress in their affairS. The military per-
sonnel felt the civil authority should appoint capable men to command the 
armies and then allow them to fight the war. They thought members of Con-
43 
gress only made it harder to win the war. General Nathanael Greene, a close 
friend of Washington I protested acidly against a system that made men of the 
sword "subJeot to the censure and reproach of every dirty little politician ig-
norant of every circumstance necessary to form a right judgment ... 92 Greene 
later in the war became a quartermaster-general which he undertook because 
he and Washington felt that a soldier must do the job if it was to be done 
properly. 
Congress ordered the General to attend its assembly in late May, 
1776, in order to draw up plans for the ensuing campaign. 93 'Washington then 
had the opportunity to report the needs of his army in person to Congress. 
Throughout April and May, arms were still in great demand but the shortage of 
powder was not as acute as it had been in the winter months. Earl1erWashing 
ton had written to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island that "in this Army ,altho' I 
have pursued every mode I could devise for procuring them (arms), their (sic) 
1s still a great deficiency and a considerable number of Men without any in 
their hands. 1194 In like manner the General had written to the Assembly of 
Massachusetts to request a shipment of musket balls, and to Hancock he had 
92 Miller I Triumph of Freedom, pp. 84-85. 
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written on April 25, II ••• the Deficiency of Arms is very great ... Can Congress 
remedy this evU? if they can, there should not a Moment be lost in effacing 
it as our strength at present is in reality on paper only; ..• 1 hope Arms may be 
procured. ,•95 Thus ~Nashington had much to say to Congress when he arrived 
in l\1ay. Congress listened to the General but it did not realize the impact of 
his remarks. 
Washington with two other generals and thirteen Congressmen dis-
cussed the plans of the army. After a few weeks of discussion Congress 
granted Washington' s request that a Board of War be instituted to supervise 
the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments. However the Board con-
sisted of five members of Congress who were stUI burdened with other de-
manding tasks within Congress. 96 Only through disavpolntments and Ineffl-
ciencies would Congress learn that its own members could not manage all the 
assigned committee work. Within a year or two they wOIJld realize that no 
group of men whose main concerns were legislative and political was prepared 
to plan and conduct a war. 97 
95 lIiWL, IV I 518. 
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On his return to camp near New York, Washington continued to inform 
the President of Congress of his military needs especially of lead and flints 
and occasionally powder. 98 Throughout the summer 'vVashington was almost 
over zealous in his orders for the protection of gunpowder. As the General 
realized the importance of ammunition and how easily the troops wasted it he 
took every necessary precaution. Frequently he ordered that whippings or 
court-martials be given to soldiers found wasting powder. 99 
In August, 1776, Hancock told Washington that t'"NO ships, one of them 
captured by a privateer, had arrived with military stores. All the cargo on 
board these ships, Hancock prOmised would be sent to the Continental Army • 
Privateers greatly aided Congress in supplying the army. The FraQklin in early 
summer had captured the British ship, !l22!t, and brought it into port with 1500 
barrels of powder, intrenching tools, and gun carriages. 1 00 These privateers 
usually were COmmissioned by state assemblies or the Congress itself to cap-
ture whatever military supplies they could. However, there were speculators 
who had little scruple in raising prices on private cargoes of munitioI)s. 
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These men took advantage of both Congress and the army by profiting from 
their hardships. Washington considered these profiteers as the "murderers of 
our cause" who should be hunted down, and "I would to God that one of the 
most atrocious of each state was hung in Gibbets upon a gallows five times as 
high as the one prepared by Haman. ,,101 Washington and Congress had no 
sympathy for these speculators who sacrificed the Uves of the army and the 
rights and Uberties of the united colonies for their own selfish gains. 
During the summer as the supply of gunpowder increased Congress be-
came concerned over the complaints about the quality of the powder. Con-
gressmen already too busy took on another task of investigating the powder, 
produced and purchased, for its quickness in firing, dryness, and strength. 
Finally in August, 1776, Congress appointed inspectors to do this testing but 
this was not matter that should need the decision of Congress. 1 02 This kind 
of work belonged to the army but Congress could not distinguish the minutiae 
from the maj or decisions. 
Between May 6, and June 14, 1776 fourteen ships arrived from the 
\llest Indies with a total of 100,000 pounds of gunpowder and many stands of 
101M1l1er, Triumph of Freedom, p. 454. 
1 o 2 Journa 1, V, 714. 
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fire arms. Another twelve ships were expected with a cargo of 10-12,000 
pounds of powder .103 As these supplies arrived they were slow to reach 
Washington I S army. On July 6, Congress informed the General that Scotch 
transports had arrived at Massachusetts and Rhode Island and that Congress 
had authorized the cargoes to be sent to the Continental Army. Washington 
then wrote to Artemas \tVard on July 9, and requested that these supplies be 
immediately sent. By late July Washington probably had some of these 
military stores. 104 
During this summer there were still soldiers without arms which led 
',;Vashington to continue to request the state governors and the Congress for 
aid. In late summer ships were still bringing powder and muskets from the 
\iv'est Indies but there is no way to ascertain how much of these military stores 
reached the Continental Army. Besides Congress's slowness to designate the 
place where arms should be sent, such supplies did not always arrive. On one 
occasion Hancock wrote to an officer that he would overlook the offense, 
103 
" ... but with respect to the Arms I order'd by Congress to be 
sent Genl. Washington, and which Mr. Glover mentions he 
without consulting you had dispos'd of among the Troops, in 
Force, V, I, 265-66. 
104Writinqs, V, 243, and Force, V, I, 691. 
48 
his Brothers Regiment, I must insist that you immedlately carry 
that resolution into Execution, and that the Arms be forwarded 
to the Genl. as as first order'd by Congress, it being my Duty 
to see every Resolve of Congress executed ... "105 
This instance of mismanagement was frequently repeated by other officers in 
charge of magazines. 
Washington was patient with Congress in their mismanagement of 
supplies but he became impatient when Congress would not let him manage 
the officers of his own army. Washington complained to the Board of War that 
he could not appoint officers to fill up his vacancies without the approval of 
Congress. On August 2, 1776, Hancock repUed to the General that 
Should Congress ever empower its Generals to fill up Vacancies 
in the Army, they knew of no one in whom they would so soon 
Repose a Trust of such Importance as in yourself: but future 
Generals may make a bad use of it. 1 06 
The President of Congress concluded that the danger of such a precedent pre-
vented Congress from allowing this power to Washington although he might 
exercise this power with the "greatest public Advantage. II Once again Con .. · 
gress's fear of military power is seen and how it hindered Nashlngton IS 
command. 
I o 5 Letters , II, pp. 25-26. 
106Wrltingi, V, 349. 
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"Support the army and that will support the government. "ithout ... 
all will fall together. ,,101 This aphorism of General Greene was not accepted 
by many members of Congress who continued to distrust the army. This dis-
trust of military officers and the fear of too strong an army is one of the chief 
reasons for the army's deficiency in military stores. Congress tried to 
adequately equip the army but because of this fear Congress was not ready to 
allow the army to care for itself. Congress still relied too much on the volun-
teer militias. Congress's indecision as to the aim of this war also hindered 
its support of the Continental Army. 
In the summer of 1116 there were three part1ee withi'1 Conl]resp. Ftrst, 
there were the conciliationists who were the smallest group I consisting 
approximately of nine members who wanted self government and autonomy 
within the British Empire. Such men a s Dickinson, Jay, Duane, and Robert 
Livingston belonged to this party. lOB Then there was the militant party made 
up of Sam and John Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, and another fourteen Congress-
men. Since they favored independence they thought an all-out war was 
necessary. 1 09 Finally there were the moderates who were the largest group 
101 Miller, Triumph of Freedom. p. 55B. 
lOBNettels, op. cit., pp. 100-01. 
l09Ibld., pp. 106-01. 
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consisting of Philip Livingston, Joseph Hewes I "Villiam Hopper, aobert 
Morris, Hancock, Silas Deane, and others. They favored the support of war 
short of independence. All three groups were united in their defence of Ameri-
can rights and in their fear of a strong military rule. 11 0 
This fear of the military is reflected in two documents that were drawn 
up that summer. First it is seen in the Virginia Bill of Rights, June 12, which 
stated that " ... in all cases the military should be under strict subordination 
to, and governed by, the civil powers. "Ill By July 2, the majority of the 
three parties in Congress agreed that the colonies must be independent of 
England to protect their rights. This meant the war-effort must be fully sup-
ported without hesitation by the Congress of the United Colonies. Neverthe-
less in the Declaration of Independence which climaxed the Congressional 
;,vork of 1776, it is charged against the King of England that he rendered "the 
military independent of and Superior to, the civil Power. 11112 
Most of these Congressmen as civilian leaders had given birth to the 
idea of revolution in America which grew and matured in the public meetings 
110 _ Ibid., pp. III 1.2. 
III Samuel E. Morison, Sources and Document: American Revolution, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 151. 
112Iournal, V, 495. 
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and assemblies of the colonies, the committees of correspondence, and the 
committees of safety. 113 In general there was a fear of any exec uti ve power 
that was too dominant or dogmatic. Some of these leaders felt the cause of 
liberty was safe only in their hands. Now the revolution was no longer an 
idea but a war and many of these same leaders were suspicious of the new 
class of men emerging as leaders t the generals. Sam Adams still said the 
colonies were in danger of "losing their liberties to some aspiring general 
wearing the uniform of the Continental Army. ,,114 Sam Adams never lost this 
fear as he proposed that the only way the Congress could avert their Caesar or 
Cromwell was by keeping the generals securely in their own control and to 
make the general the instrument of their own sovereign will. Washington's 
patience and patriotism seldom lessened with this Congressional attitude of 
distrust. In a letter to Joseph Reed the General wrote, "I am not fond of 
stretching my powers; and if the Congress will say. 'This far and no farther 
you shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst I continue in their ser-
vice. "lIS Washington continued to support Congress and obeyed their orders 
as well as their requests faithfully although it must have been trying at times. 
113 Miller, Triumph of Freedom, pp. 239-40. 
114Miller, SgmAciams, pp. 344-45. 
115Montross, op. cit., p. 241. 
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Congress could not directly order the army in the field beuause of the 
distance between the two groups but Congress could send committees to the 
army. Congress insisted not only on its theoretical but also its practical 
superiority and dignity over the army. Congress never forgot that it had or-
gan.tzed the army, directed its officers, occasionally planned its strategy. 
summoned its generals to their assembly, and countless other small details. 
Thus Congress extended its control ovel" the army by sending these committees 
to camp but they seldom could approve or order anything for the army while in 
camp. They were mere observers and messengers for Congress. Had these 
committees possessed more authority they could have saved the army from de-
lays in awaiting decisions from Congress. Congress would retain the adminis-
tration of the army until the winter of 1777 when they appointed military per-
sonnel to the Board of War. For the present army management must continue to 
suffer while Congress dallied in military matters. 116 
Not until July 2, 1776, when the English fleet arrived at New York, was 
\'Vashington sure where the English army would next attack. In August the size 
of the Continental Army increased from 17 ,225 to 27 I 000 which was the largest 
116 Louis C. Hatch, The Administration of the _[!£tn Revolytlonary 
&:mx., (New York; Longmans, Green, and Co., 1904), p. 110. 
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American force brought together under a single command during the war .117 
However the colonial troops were still outnumbered by Howe's army of 32,000 
men. Vvashington realized how indefensible New York was but he felt the 
Continental Army was not sufficiently trained or adequately supplied to attack 
tile British. In early September he conveyed this idea to Congress who 
needed to be educated in war tactics. 
In deliberating on this Question (defense of New York) it was 
impossible to forget that History, our own experience, the ad-
vice of our ablest Friends in Europe, the fear of t.l}e Enemy, and 
even the Declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our Side 
of thevVar should be defensive ... That we should on all Occa-
sions avoid a general Action I or put anything to the Risque, un-
less by a necessity I into which we ought never to be 
drawn •. ,118 
On August 27 I 1776 the ~ttle of Long Island began and the struggle 
around New York continued until November when Washington's army dwindled 
to 3,000 soldiers in retreat. The Continental Army which several times could 
have been crushed were led in a good retreat by their able General. 
New Yorkers decided to take down all the bells in the different 
Churches and public edifices in their city that they might be made into cannon. 
117Wallace, OPT cit., p. 105. 
118John C. Fitzpatrick, George \/\iashinsrton Himself I (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. I 1933) I p. 251. 
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So too they melted wtndow and clock weights I kitchen utensils, und even a 
statue of King George for musket balls ,119 New York City fell to Howe's 
forces on September 15, 1776 as'./I/ashington escaped with 13,000 troops up 
to the '. Vhite Plains above ilie city, 
Continually Vvashington's General Orders during this campaign demon-
strate his need and concarn for ammunition. On September 17, \,'}ashington 
stated that regiments who had expended their ammunition should be immedi-
ately supplied, but he was vexed ~hat soldiers still wasted powder by unneces-
sary firing .120 vVashington also warned the officers to take the greatest care 
of the arms and ammunition in bad weather . In the middle of October the 
Board of War added to the General's difficulties since they wanted the im-
mediate return of some ordnance stores, General vVashington replied that it 
was impossible to furnish such a return while the enemy was so near, "As 
large quantities are constantly in demand in time of war, he (VV'ash!ngton) does 
not conceive your provision in these instances can be too great. "121 Oc-
casionally Congress was more concerned for its own protection and for the 
119Force, V, II, 184. 
120\lIlrttinas. VI, 90, 124, 192. 
121Ibid., VI, 222. 
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conservation of military stores than for the army's defense and the expenditure 
of military stores in waging war. And yet Congress cannot be completely 
blamed as they probably did not knON the critical situation that faced the army 
On October 28, the Battle of 'lihUe Plains was fought in which Howe's 
20, 000 troops defeated the Continental Army but Washington once again so 
commanded his forces that they escaped across the Hudson River. More disas-
ters still awaited the American troops on Manhattan. On November 15, Fort 
viashington was captured and four days later Fort Lee fell to the British. 3000 
men l 146 cannons, more than 12,000 shot, nearly 3000 small arms, and 400,00 
cartridges Illlere lost to the enemy.122 Some powder hact been saved from Fort 
Lee which Washington informed Congress. In his report he added that the loss 
of the soldiers will be severely felt "but when that of the Arms and Accoutre-
ments is added, much more so, and must be a farther Incentive to procure as 
considerable a Supply as possible for the New Troops, as soon as it can be 
done. 1I123 As Washington retreated into New Jersey, Congress became alarmec 
at the failure of this campaign. 
Josiah Bartlett 'Wrote to a fellow member of Congress that "I am sorry 
our affairs at New York have succeeded so badly. Vve want a regular, well 
,U:Zf'orce, V, III, 1058-59. 
123wriUnqs, VI, 287. 
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disciplined army, more experienced Generals. A regular army we must have, 
at all events, against another year. ,,124 For the first time many in Congress 
saw how ill prepared 'L'leir army was for battle with experienced and well-
.3qulpped British RegulaI S • President Hancock, himself, requested longer en-
listments, 
..• give me leave to observe that to make m€m well acquainted 
with the duties of a soldier, requires Time: and to bring them 
under proper subordination and Discipline, not only requires 
time, but has always been a work of much difficulty ... as the 
time of their dischurge approaches, they l;Jrow careless of their 
arms, ammunition, etc. I and impatient of all Restraint .125 
Finally Congress seemed to have heard what Washington had reported. 
Washington had warned Congress of short enlistments but his words had fallen 
on deaf ears. The General wrote to his brother that he had pointed out the evil 
. consequence that result from short term militia • 
The consequence of which, you have had great bodies of 
militia in pay that never were in campi you have had an im-
mense quantities of provisions drawn by men that never ren-
dered you one hour's service (at least usefully) and this in the 
most profuse and wasteful way.1 26 
124Porce, V, II, 1459-60. 
125Leqers, II, 99. 
126Writ1ngs, VI, 137. 
57 
In the winter of 1775-76, V.'ashington had thought short enlistments would be 
the waste of arms and ammunition cmd the ruin of the army. In December, 1776 
the army was still in great need of arms and powder because ',Vashington in 
his own hand wrote to ConiJres::i that many of the militia: 
threw' their Arms away I some lost them, whilst others deserted 
and took them along. In a word, altho' I used every precaution 
to preserve them, the loss has been great, and this will forever 
be the ~,se in such a Mixed and irregular Army as ours has 
been. l 
'rhe General thought a regular army would end this .vaste of arms and ammuni-
tion since the militia had been "the origin of all our misfortunes and the great 
accumulation of our debts. I! 12·8 
The states as well as Congress must be blamed for this fear of the 
standing army. Although Congress gradually realized that battles could be 
won only by experienced and well supplied troops, the bogey of a standing 
army and the fear of military power still influenced many of the Congressmen. 
This fear seems to have been too ingrained in their traditions and background. 
Perhaps history would repeat itself, too many members thought. However Con-
gress persevered in their attempts to procure war materiel and even requested 
127 Ibl.r!:, VI, 406. 
128Porce, V, III, 1311. 
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the states to lengthcrl their enlistments. The state aS3embl1ps cooperated 
but continued to suppcrt their own militias over the Continental Army. 
One member of Congress I Edward Rutledge I '.:Vfote to John Jay at this 
time that Congress posses3ed its share of hclman weakness; the way members 
allo'JI their attention to h3 engrossed by subjects which c(.luld have been post-
poaod while others require ::!espatch instead of neglect. 1.29 Minutiae as well 
as personal disputes frequently slmved the work of Congreos to the detriment 
of the army and of the united oolonies. 
During November and December much needed arms and ammunition ar-
rived from Prance by way of the -"/est Indies. Silas Decme who was in Paris 
even sent 100 barrels of gunpowder by way of Amsterdam ,130 At this time too, 
Deane recommended Congress to deal with a Frenchman I Beaumarchais, under 
the name of Hortalez et Compagnie in purchasing war materiel. Deane hoped 
that a treaty of some kind would soon be arranged with Prance that could 
lessen the shortage of arms and powder. He even suggested to Congress that 
they 
... engage a great general, of the highest character in 
Europe •.• to take the lead of your armies, whether such a step 
129 v\<-rltinas, VI, 246. 
130Porce, V, III, 512, 596, 1050, 1371, 1436. 
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would not be politick I as it would give a character and credit 
to your military I and strike, perhaps a greater panic in our 
enemies. 131 
Congress does not seem to have seriously considered this, As the arrival of 
these ordnance stores from France came to the attention of Congress I usually 
they ordered them to be sent to the Continental Army as soon as possible The 
situation was too critical for Congres~3 to delay, If the army was defeated this 
'illinter the cause of the United Colonies Nas also defeated, 
In mid December as the Nar situation began to look desperate ( Con-
gress decided to flee Philadelphia for Baltimore. Before their departure on 
December 12 I Congress enacted a nnst extrctordin::ry resolution. It stc1ted 
that 'I.. Ui1til th.e Congress shall otht'!rvvise order, General ':'Iashington be 
possesse6 of full pOiler to order and clin;ct all things relative to the depart-
ment and to the operation :.>f war .. ,132 The ideo. of delegating such authority 
.vas finally approved because Congress :;ne\'I1 '''a~l:dngton must be ab3.8 to act 
immediately without a \vaiting their decisions. Other/vise thE:yhole aim. Df the 
revolutIon I l:berty and self government J,.V0u1d ')8 sacrificed to th214' 0 Vl1 fear 
of a possible di~tatorship Four days after this dec.ist::m\obert t!iorrisvr::>te 
to Congress: 
131Ibid. I V, III, 901, 1089. 
132Iournal, VI, 1027. 
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In short, if the Congress mean to succeed in this contest, they 
must pay good executive men to do their business as it ought to 
be, and not lavish millions away by their own mismanagement, 
because no man living can attend the daily deliberation of Con-
gress and do executive parts of business at the same time .133 
In supplying as well as directing the army Congress had to risk delegating 
their authority and sharing their responsibilities if they hoped to prevent fur-
ther mismanagement of the war effort. 
On December 27, Congress e.'h"tended v'.ashington's powers for six 
months and specified more clearly what his powers were. The main powers 
were concerned with the care of the army but he could also exercise martial 
law. 134 Only a week prior to this, .vhen the General VITote to Congress to 
petition them for power to promote soldiers in the field, he said: 
It may be said that this is an application for powers that are 
too dangerous to be entrusted. I can only add that desperate 
diseases require desperate remedies; and with truth declare, 
that I have no lust after power I but wish with as much fervency 
as any man upon this wide-extended Continent for an oppor-
tunity of turning the sword into a ploughshare .135 
Washington, himself, must have thought it strange that Congress should en-
1 33 Porce, V, III, 1241. 
134IournaL VI, 1045-46. 
135Porce, V, III, 1311. 
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trust him with so much power but it was the opinion of many Congressmen that 
it was absolutely necessary. 
liilliam Hooper wrote to Robert Morris that Congress had endowed 
'dashington with I'large povvers " and that the business of war will novv be in 
the IIproper channels and the Congress be no longer exercised about matters 
Nhich it is supremely ignorant ... 136 Whipple vvrote that itvvas "thought ab-
solutely necessary for the Salvation of America. ,137 Finally Benjamin Rush 
stated in a letter that "General,iashington must be invested with dictatorial 
power for a few months or we are undone. The vis inertiae of the Congress 
has almost ruined this country. ,,138 Congress trusted their3eneral partly be-
cause they had no other choice but defeat. 
During these last feN days in 1776, Congress revealed the locations 
of the powder magazines to ',.8shington and informed him that he had full 
access to these supplies. If he thought it necessary he could increase the 
size of the army and appoint officers. Congress even .vrote lJashington 'L"lat 
they flere happy that this Country had a General Nho could be entrusted -vith 
136Letters, II, 196. 
137Ibid" II, 198. 
138 Force, V, UI, 1487. 
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such "unlimited Po Ncr and neither personal 38curity I liberty, or property be 
111 the least degree endangered thereby. ,,139 So it seems thativhen on the 
brink of disaster Congress who so often feared the powers of the c::aesars and 
the Praetorian Guards imitated the old Roman Senate and created a temporary 
dictatorship. 
139.!12i.!L, V, III, 1618, and Letters, II, 198. 
CHAPTER IV 
VALLEY FORGE: DESPAIR AND HOPE 
dashington's victory at Trenton on December 26, 1776, renewed Con-
~ress I s hopes and encouraged all the colonies. Certainly it was not an over-
whelming victory but it came at a time when the cause of liberty seemed futile 
and lost to many. The srnall army struck the British again at Princeton on 
January 3, 1777, and turned back the British troops Although this was more 
a skirmish than a battle it proved to the British that the Continental Army had 
great recuperative ability and must be reckoned with. ""ashington then led his 
soldiers to Mon'istown for winter quarters where he attempted to reorganize, 
train, and better equip his army. 
vvhile in winter quarters ""vashington issued an order under the jurisdic 
tion of his dictatorial powers. He stated that all those in the area around his 
camp who had subscribed to Howe's declaration of pardon must take an oath of 
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allegiance to the United Colonies or leave for the British lines. 140 (:;ongress 
Nas disturbed by the General's exercise of his pOi,ver because they thought it 
Nas an infringement on the civil rights of the states. Congress I s concern re-
fleets their fundamental distrust of General 'ashington's power, the very 
pONer Nith 'Nhich they entrusted him. 
Th::-oughout 1777 Congress urged the colonial assemblies to supply the 
army with military stores. Congress cttempted to cooperate with the army as 
Nell as they could but they were disturbed by too many other problems. In 
late January Congress orderedji 8shington to send 94 tons of powder to 
General SchUyler who commanded the army in New England .;;\/ashington could 
not fulfill this request since he had no more powder than was necessary for the 
immediate consumption of his own army,141 Although 'vashington kept Con-
greas regularly informed, they seldom communicated important matters to 
their Commander-in-Chief. Prom February to April Nashington's letters re-
flect his concern for military stores, He feared that powder was a great defi-
ciency in all the colonies since many state assemblies v,rere wTiting to him 
140 Fitzpatrick I op. cit., p. 285. 
" . 
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requesting ammunition ,142 In a letter to the Massachusetts Assembly 
General \IVashington stated that: 
Nothing distresses me more than the Universal Call that is 
upon me from all Quarters I for Fire Arms I which I am totally 
unable to supply, The scandalous Loss, waste, and private 
appropriation of Public Arms, during the last campaign is be-
yond all conception ,143 
As the General could do little to procure arms at least he hoped to prevent such 
great loss and waste of public arms, He ordered that "United States" be 
stamped on all the weapons and that the muskets in need of repair be not dis-
carded but fixed. 144 The loss of five to eight thousand muskets a year in the 
Continental Army led Congress in February to request the colonies to purchase 
all the arms of private persons who had no immediate need of their fire 
arms ,145 In March, 1777 I Washington sent a circular to the Ne',., England 
assemblies and personally wrote a letter to the Governor of Connecticut, 
Trumbull, to cooperate witb this request of Congress ,146 At times Congress 
142.!!lliL, VII, 169. 
143Ibid , VII, 208-09. 
144 Ibid., VII, 340-41, 358. 
145Montross, QP. cit., p. 270 
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was as unable as the General to procure arms since they cou~d only request 
the state assemblies to cooperate with their demands. 
V\/ashington complained to Congress that his enquiry about the amount 
of military stores on hand had not been answered. \Vhen two and three 
states were completely unrepresented in Congress delay was inevitable. 
Samuel Chase complained to his ONG Maryland Committee of Safety that: 
It is not only necessary to be represented, but be assured the 
Business, the Interest of these States require a full Represen-
tation. vve have not thirty Members in Congress, and it is not 
only improper, but impossible, for so small a Number to con-
duct so very important Business ,147 
Under such circumstances Congress continued to do its best in the procure-
ment of war materiel, 
Washington's concern and worry about war materiel was reduced when 
he received word of the Mercury's arrival at Philadelphia. The Mercury, one 
of Beaumarchais' supply ships, brought 11,000 muskets plus other needed 
military stores. Most of these muskets were from the French royal arsenals 148 
Congressman vVhipple remarked that the arrival of this vessel "is the most 
lucky circumstance that could have happened,' and John Adams wrote to James 
147Letters, II, 229-30. 
148Charles VV. Sawyer, Firearms in American History, (2 vols.; 
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Warren that, liOn how many Occasions when We have been unable to see any 
Way to help ourselves has Providence sent us an unexpected Relief. Thus it 
has been, and thus it will be ... 149 Congressmen as well as army officers re-
j oicedover this cargo. 
On April 20, 1777, another French ship, the Amphitrite, docked at 
Portsmouth with 12,000 muskets and 1000 barrels of gunpowder. After this 
Washington remarked to Governor Trumbull that "we shall have no further com-
plaints for the want of arms. 1,150 Congress was confident too, but ·Washington 
immediately urged them to appoint someone to direct all these military stores 
lest confusion and ill consequences result. 151 The General also hoped that 
these supplies would be moved inland to prevent any quick naval attack by the 
British navy. One ship, the Seine, which Congress awaited was captured by 
the British .152 However during the remainder of the summer, 1711, French 
ships carrying war materiel purchased with Beaumarchais I aid, continued to ar-
rive at New England harbors. Most of these arms and ammunition went to the 
149Letters , II, 310. 
150 Writings, VII, 334. 
151JJ;Wl., VIII, 2-3, 7-8. 
152 Ibid., VII, 216, 330. 
68 
army in the North but Washington must have received some of them. John 
Adams who was on the Board of War wrote to Warren in late March, 1777 I that: 
There is no danger of our wanting Arms or Ammunition for the 
future - between six and seven hundred Barrells of Powder 
having arrived in Maryland, and indeed, We have plenty of 
Powder before. In short, my Friend, although We have many 
gdevousthings to bear, and shall have more; yet there is 
nothing wanting but Patience .153 
France generously aided the American cause long before any formal treaty or 
alliance was made Through the efforts of Silas Deane Congress was secretly 
negotiating with France and hoped France would soon declare openly in favor of 
the colonies. 
Somehow arms were scarce again in April when Congress stipulated that 
the states must arm their soldiers before they were sent to the Continental 
Army. The army had no surplus of muskets and there was a shortage of cart-
14' 
ridges. 5 Washington ordered that the troops' arms and ammunition be 
regularly inspected so that the soldiers could account satisfactorily for any 
deficiency or pay for it .155 On June 10 and 20, 1777, the General wrote that 
the army could use any spears that might be stored in the armory, and he 
153Letters, II, 313. 
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specified the way he wanted 500 spears to be made for his "Horse and Light 
Foot ... 156 In a reply to a letter of Governor Trumbull Washington apologized 
that he could not supply him with any arms as there was hardly a sufficient 
supply to meet the demands of the Continental Army. What amazed Washington 
was that the late importation of arms outnumbered the Continental troops raised 
to use them. "lhese have not and could not have been all put into their hands; 
and yet there are very few of them (muskets) now to be fOUlld undisposed 
of. ,,157 In this same letter the General told the Governor to supply the Con-
tinental troops with arms rather than the militia because he could order the 
Continental Army more quickly to a trouble spot than a governor would send his 
militia. Friction between the army and militia still existed and this was most 
felt in regard to supplies. 
The war effort was further thwarted as state assemblies would pay high 
bounties in order to raise troops for their militia. Washington found it difficult 
to enlist men to whom Congress paid minimal wages. John Adams realized that 
these short term militia could not win the war as he remarked that "We shall 
never do well until we get a regular army and this will never be until men are 
156WsL" VIII, 222,. 272. 
157l2!sL, VIll, 334-35. 
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enl1sted for a longer duration. ,,158 This meant that Congress must grant more 
generous bounties and better pay. Congress was reluctant to do this but if the 
war was to be won Congress and the army and the colonies had to cooperate 
and compromise. 
Thomas Burke of North carolina informed his Governor that within Con-
gress "all particular jealousies are for the present laid to sleep I and long and 
uninterrupted may their slumber be. We are more wisely employed in giving 
vigor to our military operations and in correcting abuses in our depart-
ments .... ,159 If harmony existed between the members of Congress, it did not 
yet exist between Congress and their army. Washington wrote to Governor 
Trumbull that he did not know where Congress had sent some of his new troops 
which had upset his plans. 160 From time to time Congress would order soldiers 
to a town or arsenal without informing the Commander-in-Chief. In June, 1777, 
Washington wrote Richard H. Lee, a Congressman from Virginia t that he had re-
ceived no answer to a request of his: II ••• and this being frequently the case, 
leaves me often in a very disagreeable state of suspense, from which a simple 
158 Smith, op, cit., pp. 287-88. 
159Letters , fi, 325. 
160WritiQSls, VIII, 43-44. 
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yea or nay would relieve me ... 161 Congress lost in their own work continued to 
test the patience and loyalty of their General. 
Muskets were still a serious problem in July as John Adams informed 
'Warren that although 18,000 arms had arrived at Portsmouth, he did not know 
what became of them. Other arms had also arrived in Massachusetts but Con-
gress had no idea where they had gone .162 Washington feared that the arms 
quickly vanished due to the carelessness of his officers and the mismanage-
ment of Congress. Thus he reported to the Board of War that a set of arms 
would be as necessary as a new suit of clothes each year .163 
Towards the middle of July, 1777, a committee from Congress arrived to 
confer with the General and on August 5, they reported to the whole Congress 
that the army needed not only arms but also food and clothing. 164 There were 
serious problems in the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments. In the 
past Congress had so interfered with these two departments and had so bound 
their hands that in August the Commissary General, Joseph Trumbull, resigned 
161Ibid., VUI, 160. 
162Letters, II, 404. 
163writ!ngs, VIII, 388. 
164Iournal, VIII, 546, 608-15. 
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and in October, Thomas Mifflin, the Quartermaster General resigned. Although 
"Washington reminded Congress frequently of the need of these officers for the 
very existence of the army no new apPointments were made. This committee 
made known the need of a better organization within the army for the location 
of food and military stores but Congress took no immediate action. The army, 
not Congress, would suffer for this failure. 
The shortage of powder was no longer so severe. By the fall of 1111 , 
the colonies had imported 1,454, 210 pounds of gunpowder, had locally pro-
duced 115,000 pounds of powder from saltpetre, and had made 698,245 pounds 
of powder from 418,250 pounds of imported saltpetre. The total amount of gun-
powder in the colonies was then estimated at 2,261,455 pounds. Massachu-
setts and Pennsylvania made the largest contributions to this quantity of 
gunpowder. 165 Ninety per-cent of this powder came from Prance by way of the 
West Indies. The crisis of gunpowder had passed but the Continental Army 
would never be as fully supplied as the British Regulars. Together Washington 
and Congress had accomplished this difficult task. 
The army remained in need of arms. Washington ordered that all dis-
carded arms should be collected and repaired. Soldiers often were issued a 
165 Stephenson, 02 t cit., p. 211. 
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new musket because no gunsmith was in camp who could fix the old one. 166 
By the end of the summer the shortage of food and clothing became a graver con-
cern to Congress and their General than their musket shortage. 
Military and civil affairs grew worse in September when Washington was 
forced to retreat from Brari(jywine. In this battle the army contained nearly a 
thousand troops without muskets. 167 Vifashington had hoped to defend Phlla-
delphia from Brandywine but his troops were outflanked by the British. Although 
the Continental Army retreated in good order, they left behind some artillery. 
Shortly afterwards on September 18, 1777, Congress quickly fled from Phila-
delphia and on September 27, General Howe marched triumphantly into the city. 
The dignity of Congress had again been ruffled as they were forced to leave 
their city comforts. Congress blamed Washington and the army for the indig-
nity and physical inconvenience which they suffered. They so easUy seem to 
have forgotten that the condition of the army was partly due to their own 
muddling incompetency. 168 Before Congress departed for York I Pennsylvania, 
166Writings, IX, 18-19. 
167Rufus Lincoln, Papers. 1776-178Q, James Minor Lincoln (ed.), 
Private Printing, 1904), p. 10. 
168Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 312. 
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it invested 'Washington with dictatorial powers for sixty days .169 Only when 
everything seemed beyond hope did Congress trust "Vashington and his 
seeming "military might." Congress delegated this power to the General be-
cause it seemed to be the lesser of two evils; defeat or dictator. 
Congress J s confidence had been shaken during this military crisis in 
which the army could only retreat. Congress accepted the advice of Washing-
ton and appointed a new Board of War made up of military personnel. But Con-
gress sacrificed any immediate hope of harmony between the Board of War and 
the army by choosing adversaries of 'Washington. Gates, Mifflin, and Conway 
made up the Board. The members of Congress seem to have intended this as a 
170 
system of checks and balances. 
Congress could not understand \Vashington' s continual retreat maneuver 
but the General had one aim, to win the war. The only way possible was to 
fight a war of skirmishes, avoiding any major engagements unless the odds 
were heavily in his favor. He h~'d to keep his army together and strong enough 
to harass Howe's forces but an aU-out attack would quickly put an end to his 
army and the war. While Washington did not prefer this kind of war, he 
realized it was the only kind of war his army, often impaired by the shortage of 
169Igurnal, VIII, 751. 
170M111er , Triumph of Freedom, p. 254. 
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military stores, could engage ih at the present. Congress did not yet appreci-
ate this military insight .171 Some Congressmen thought vVashington was too 
hesitant to be an effective general. 
Since Howe's forces were split and Washington was tired of Congress's 
complaints of inactivity, he decided to attack the main British force at German-
town. On October 4, 1777 foggy weather brought confusion to the inexperi-
enced troops of the Continental Army and Washington lost the effect of his 
surprise attack. The army was prevented from any further attack because of 
the scarcity of powder .172 The attack, however, was not completely in vain 
because it reinforced Howe's conviction that the Continental Army had a lot of 
fight. Both armies then settled in their winter quarters - the British at 
Philadelphia and the Americans at Valley Forge. 
During the winter of 1777, the relations between Congress and the army 
became more strained. 'Washington who considered himself the servant of Con-
gress reporte~ regularly by letters to Congress, but frequently he was kept in 
the dark by Congress not only of civil matters but also of military. It seems 
that Washington was told nothing of the forthcoming French Alliance by Con-
171 Fitzpatrick, ?p. cit., p. 297. 
172Wrltings, lX, 477-78. 
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gress .173 Members of Congress thought it best that the possible alliance be 
kept a secret from the General despite the protest of Henry Laurens who was 
then President of Congress .174 Perhaps the Legislators were too busy to keep 
vVashington informed, but it is more likely that Congress wanted to remind the 
General that he was subordinate to them and must depend on them for whatever 
information they wanted to make known. Washington began to mistrust some of 
. the Congressmen whom he felt were working more for their own selfish purposes 
than for the common welfare of the united colonies. 
In late October Congress celebrated General Gates' victory over 
Burgoyne at Saratoga as the news had just reached them . Washington wrote to 
General Putnam that liThe defeat of General Burgoyne is a most important event, 
and such as must afford the highest satisfaction to every well affected 
American. ,,175 News of this victory gave a powerful impetus to an attack 
against Washington which became known as the Conway Cabal. To some Con-
173Force, V, II, 839, and V, III, 1437. 
174Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 243. I have found nothing in my 
research to substantiate this claim of Miller except a few remarks in Force, 
V, II, 839. At the same time I found no evidence to deny it. My proof rests 
with Miller who gave no references to primary sources. 
175William S. Baker, ItInerarY of General 'Nashington, (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1892), p 99. 
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gressmen t..'Ile Commander-in-Chief had accomplished almost nothing except a 
seri3S of failures. Sam Adams felt that Continentals must fight the British to 
the finish and could have defeated the British bad there been an energetic cam-
paign in the fall of 1777 . 176 Conway who sought his own promotion wrote to 
General Gates in early November that "HGaven has been determined to save 
'lour country or a weak General and bad counsellors would have ruined it. ,,177 
This clearly implied that Washington was that IIweak General". The Congress 
wanted a General who won major victories and now they had one in Gates. 
Linked with Sam Adams were Mifflin, James Lovell, Benjamin Rush and even 
Richard H, Lee who thought a New England General was needed to win the war. 
Secttonalism was still prevalent in Congress. There were secret conferences 
but little is known about the plans of these Congressmen except that they ex-
pected Washington's resignation to be soon given to Congress .178 For a 
time 'Washington's recommendations went unheeded as Congress hesitated to 
give him their full support. On December 30. 1777, lafayette wrote to his 
General: 
17 6 Miller , Sam Adams, p. 348 I quoting Warren-Adams Letters, I, 278. 
177 Baker. op. cit., p. 104. 
178Letters, III, 267. 
78 
There are open dissension in Congress; parties who hate one 
another as much as the common enemy; men who, without 
knowing any thing about war, undertake to judge you, and to 
make ridiculous comparisons. They are infatuated with Gates, 
without ~inking of the differences of circumstances, and bel1ev 
that attacking is the only thing necessary to conquer. These 
ideas are entertained by some jealous men, and perhaps secret 
friends of the British Government I who want to push you, in a 
moment of ill humor, to some rash enterprise upon the lines, or 
against a much stronger army.179 
Washington was well aware that Congress was opposed to his "Fabianism II but 
he refused to be pressured by them against his better military judgment. He 
answered Lafayette's letter the next day: 
For it is well known I that neither ambitious, nor lucrative mo-
tives led me to accept my present Appointment; in the discharge 
of which I have endeavoured to observe one steady and uniform 
conduct, which I shall Invariably pursue, while I have the honor 
to command, regardless of the Tongue of slander or the powers 0 
detraction .180 
Massachusetts and Virginia as a whole refused to turn against Vlashing-
ton but it was not until mid summer 1778, that vVashington regained Congress's 
confidence. The General felt it was his duty to remain with the army until he 
was dismissed by Congress. In January he wrote a friend, Reverend William 
Gordon: 
179 Writings, X, 236. 
180 Ibid., X, 237. 
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So soon as the yublic gets dissatisfied .vith my service or a 
person is found better qualified to answer her expectation, I 
shall quit the helm with as much satisfaction, and retire to a 
private station with as much content as ever the wearied pilgrim 
felt upon his safe arrival in the Holy-land .181 
V/ashington was sensitive to the dissatbtaction within Congress and 
was "exceedingly hurt with these Observations and hard speeches" but he was 
determined not to resign .182 The jealousy and intrigue of this cabal furthered 
the estrangement between Congress and Washington's army during a time of 
great need, Valley Porge. 
Valley Porge became a tragedy because the arnlY was in the midst of 
pler;.ty or very near to it but could not share in it. There was no shortage of 
food in the colonies and }'et food did not reach the army because of the greed 
of farmers who insisted on hard cash for their produce. Also the transportation 
system with the army was completely tangled and confused. In reality the 
Quartermaster Department did not exist while Congress failed to do anything 
oxcept discuss new plans for a Quartermaster Department. The problem of 
supplying the army was now as serious as it had been a year ago. On Decem-
ber 23 ,Washington addressed Congress in a long letter on the needs of the 
1811 3 ~, X, 38. 
182Boudinot, op. cit., p. 52. 
80 
army and on their responsibilities to the army: 
I can assure the gentlemen that it is much easier and a less dis-
tressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a 
good fin:~side, than to occupy a cold I bleak hill, and sleep un-
der frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However, al-
though they seem to have little feeling for the naked and 
distressed soldiers, I feel abundantly for them, and from my 
soul, I pity those miseries which it is neither in my power to 
relieve or prevent. 183 
In the same letter WashIngton told Congress that the "army can do three 
things, starve, dissolve, or disperse. II 
Some of the Congressmen opposed to Washington seem to have blinded 
Congress to the pressing needs of the ragged army. This is evident from a 
letter of 'Washington to Robert Morris in which he complained that he seemed to 
have failed to make completely known the true state of affairs in camp since 
Congress thought "it is but to say, Presto BegoI'Q and everything is done. ,,184 
Occasionally Congress almost believed that it was the duty and privilege of 
the soldier to suffer for his country. Lafayette remarked "these veterans have 
patience in their misery which is unknown to European armies ... 185 This could 
18 ~ .... flUng s, X, 196. 
184Alfred H. Bill, Valley Forge: the Making of an Army, (New York: 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 12. 
185Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 499. 
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as well have been said of Vlashington. while Congress discussed the food and 
clothing shortage, foreign ofHcers in the Alnerican armv were reported to have 
said that no other government than a republic would have inflicted such unneces-
sary suffering upon its defenders .186 
As officers would no longer make excuses for thAir legislators the army 
began to complain and spoke of Congress with contempt ,187 'Nashington 
warned Congress that there was a pOint beyond which the patience, fortitude, 
and loyalty af the troops could not be driven. If the army this winter did not 
reach that pOint it was mostly due to their General. Vlithout strong leaders the 
army would have fallen to pieces. The cause of liberty, alone, cannot stir men 
to valor when food, clothing, and arms are lacking, but a personal loyalty to a 
commander can strengthen men in their determination. The very thing that Con-
gress feared ~nosti the army's loyalty to its general rather than its nation, it 
forced upon the army < 
Congress had given Washington pov!er to impress supplies from the 
surrounding countryside but he was slow to act because he knew colonial re-
sentment vi the military power. The farmers no less than the Congressmen 
186Hatch, op. cit., p. 223 
187 Ibid., p. 94, quoting Joseph Clark, "Diary," New Jersey HistOrical 
Society Proceedings, 1st series, VII, 104. 
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detested a military dictator. Although \.IVashington had to impress supplies and 
wagons he feared that he would make more enemies than friends among the far-
mers. He was so concerned about the use of this power that he r.;;quested Con-
gress to let the states use their civil authority to impress the farmer's supplies 
since: 
The people at large are governed by Custom, To Acts of Legisla-
tion or Civil Authority they have been ever taught to yield a 
willing ob~dlence without reasoning about their propriety. On 
those of Military power, whether immediate or derived 
originally from anothfA Source, they ever looked with a jedlous 
and suspicious eye. 8 
On several occasions Congress urged the General to exercise this power of im-
pressment but he was sensitive to the friction between military and civil 
authority, and thus rarely used this authorization. Besides, the soldiers were 
seldom either well-enough or adequately dressed to travel outside the camp for 
any impressment of supplies. 189 
Though there were many opponents of Washington in Congress who were 
loud in their criticism, there were also many who were concerned with the 
welfare of the army and who valued Washington . Congress resolved in late 
November to send a committee to camp to devise ways to supply the army and 
188;/1"iti1195 « X, 1 S~ • 
189Thacher, OR. cit., p. 153. 
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the best means of carrying on the next campaign" At the beginning of the new 
year, 1778, another comrnitte~ was authorizeq by C.ongress to ~"isit'l/ashington 
at Valley Forge .190 '!'he first c'?mmittee remained in camp all winter, and due 
to either misunderstanding or ignorance frequently antagonized the officers. 
On the other hand the vt$lt1ng comrnittee~ often were sympathetic to the army 
and would represent the army's grievances in Congress .191 By means of these 
and othet committees Congress attempted to keep in touch with the army and 
perhaps more closely direct it. 
At the time Congress extended Washington's extraordinary powers, it 
also resolved that one month's extraordinary pay be given to the troops for 
"their soldierly patience, fidelity, and in zeal in the cause of their country. II 
COllgress further assured the soldiers that it was trying to remedy their 
grievances by better direction of the Commissary Department .192 Congress 
tried hard, but this was not qood enough as Hamilton remarked, "In what Con-
<;Jress had at any time done for the army, they h.ave been commonly been too 
190Iournal. lX, 972. 
191 Montross, op. cit., p. 242. 
192 Burnett, 2P.::....cl~ '.' p. 277. 
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late ... 193 Certainly this was most true of Valley Forge. 
Congress attempted to supply the army but often provisions on the way 
never reached the camp or could not be shipped from the depots because of the 
scarcity of wagons and horses. During the winter of Valley Forge Washington • s 
correspondence constantly mentions the need for clothing, food, and transpor-
tation. Likewise Congress' s IOUJ'!lA1 records the orders of military supplies. 
Congress was sympathetic to these needs but they were utterly unable to re-
lieve them because of the inefficiency of the Quartermaster and Commissary 
Departments. Congress was deceived by some profiteers and speculators who 
had no concern for the army.194 There was graft I speculation I selfishness I 
and even some meaness, but gross mismanagement strained Congress's rela-
tions with the army and caused much needless privation and worry. Gradually 
Congress realized that it could not oversee all the duties it had assumed. Con 
gress decided to share some of these responsibilities with men who were not 
members of Congress. Nathanael Greene, a close friend of Washington and a 
soldier I perhaps could organize the Quartermaster Department. On March 2, 
193Allen Bowman, The Moral' of the American Revolyt1onary Army, 
(Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public AffairS, 1943), p. 93, 
quoting Hamilton, Writings, I, 168. 
194 Wallace, OR. cit., p. 169. 
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1778, Greene was appolnted to the post of Quartermaster General by Con-
gress .195 
Added to the army's problem of suffiolent food and olothing was the de-
ficlency of muskets whlch still concerned Washington. In late December and 
again in January several ships an1ved with arms, gunpowder, musket balls, 
saltpetre, and some cannon.196 Washington congratulated the army on their 
arrival and oonsldered these French ships as proof that France was well dts-
posed towards the colonies. The General maintained discipline throughout the 
winter as well as he could with a ragged and half starved army that frequently 
deserted for a period. General orders stipulated that the soldiers' ammunition 
must be examined carefully each day at roll call to prevent the waste of any 
197 powder. 
When Baron von Steuben arrived on February 27, 1778, he described 
the army he saw encamped at Valley Forge: 
The arms at Valley Forge were in a horrible condition, oovered 
with Nst, half of them without bayonets, many from which a 
single shot could not be fired. Th. pouches were quite as bad 
195Iguma1, X, 210. 
196Writ1nqs, X, 181, 202. 
197~, X, 358-59. 
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as the arms. A great many of the men had tin boxes instead of 
pouches, others had cow homs; and muskets, carbines, fowling 
pieces, and rifles were to be seen in the same company. The 
description of the dress is most easily given. The men were 
literally naked; some of them in the fullest extent of the 
word. I98 
On March 28, Congress appointed von Steuben Inspector General of the Army 
which post he served excellently. He enforced a rugged discipline in his 
training throughout the spring, 1778, as new recruits came into camp. 
Despite the privations and frustrations Congress caused the army, a 
well-equiped and well-disciplined ConUnental Army emerged from Valley Forge 
in June, 1778. The equipment and food had been supplied by Quartermaster 
General Greene who accepted his position only if he was not hampered by Con-
gress. Congress slowly learned the advantage of the centralization of 
authority as it allowed Greene his desired freedom of action. 
Most of the soldiers had a musket and bayonet in which he had a new 
confidence because of Baron von Steuben' straining. Before the Baron' s in-
structions, the Continentals seldom relied on their bayonets as few knew how 
to use them well. John Laurens wrote to his father, the President of Congress, 
in early April that: 
I must not omit to inform you that Baron Steuben is making a 
sensible progress with our soldiers •.. If Mr. Howe opens the 
198Baker, OR. Cit., p. 123, quoting Kapp, Life of Steuben. 
87 
campaign with his usual deliberation, and our recruits or 
draughts come in tolerably well, we shall be infinitely better 
prepared to meet him, than ever we have been .199 
All the soldiers were equiped with knapsacks, cutting swords or tomahawks, 
cartridge pouches I and American flints. The army was st111 Without uniforms 
but they wore a Itrifle dress" which was a hunting shirt, long breeches and 
leggings, a dark hat decked with a cockade or green twig, and a white belt 
over their shoulder for their cartridge pouch. 200 
The hardships and difficulties endured together at Valley Forge gave the 
troops a new bond of union. Congress through its mismanagement and seeming 
indifference, nevertheless, had welded together an army under the skilful and 
faithful direction of General Washington. The situation looked much brighter 
in this spring of 1778 as Washington and von Steuben placed their confidence in 
these soldiers who were hardened veterans, the core of the Continental Army. 
The army still had to be tested under fire but Washington waited for Howe to 
make the first move. As summer approached Washington hoped that a better un-
derstanding and cooperation between the Congress and 1ts military army could 
be achieved. 
199~, p. 123. 
200 . Bill, OR, pH Of pp. 191-92. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CRISIS IS PASSED 
In the early spring of 1778 Congress's attendance improved as the 
legislators returned expecting to piok up business where they had left it the 
previous winter. Henry laurens, distressed by this cavalier attitude, wrote to 
James Duane who had been absent from Congress since December, 1777: 
What representation had ye for upward of three precious months, 
when those things were done which ought not to have been done, 
and those left undone which ought to have been done? ... seldom 
15 to 17 (members) made a very full House - you well know Sir, 
the unavo~g!ble drudgery of Committees requires more 
hands .•. 
Laurens had every right to oomplain as Congress accomplished most of its work 
in committees which depended on a full representation of the colonies. 
Necessary decisions frequently had to wait. This spring Congress hoped to re-
organize the army especially in the commissary department and to improve the 
financial status of the United Colonies. 
201 Burnett, OR. cit., pp. 319-20. 
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On April 7, 1778, Congress agreed to make a Contract with 
Beaumarchais' s Roderique Hortalez et Compagnie for arms, ammunition, 
clothing, and other military stores, Within a year after this agreement 
Beaumarchais sent eight shiploads of war materiel valued at five to s1x million 
livres to the colonies, 202 Congress was relieved by Beaumarchais's success-
ful efforts to supply the Continental Army. 
In this same spring of 1778, General Washington was displeased with 
Congress as it would neither increase the pay of his officers nor grant them any 
kind of pension after the war. As a result some of his officers were resigning 
when the General needed them most. Vvashington revealed his feelings about 
the army and Congress in a long letter to John Banister who was a delegate from 
Virginia. However, VVashington seems to have intended that the letter be read 
by other Congressmen too: 
We must take the passions of Men as Nature has given them, ani 
those prinCiples as a guide which are generally the rule of 
Action. I do not mean to exclude altogether the Idea of Patri-
otism. I know it exists, and I know it has done much in the 
present Contest. But I will venture to assert, that a great and 
202Edward S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778, 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1962), p. 79, quoting ~Vharton, I, 60, and 
Journal, X, 316-21. 
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1a sting war can never be supported on this principle alon~. It 
must be aided by a prospect of Interests or some reward. 03 
Washington, unlike some of the Congressmen, was a practical man, He 
realized that political philosophy or the ideal of independence was not suffi-
cient to keep his soldiers in the field. 
Washington continued in this letter to compose his thoughts in a manner 
that was rare in his correspondence. The small number of Congressmen present 
and their limited talents concerned the General. "I wish our representation in 
Congress was complete and full from every State, and that it was formed of the 
first Abilities among us. Whether we continue to War, or to proceed to Nego-
tiate, the Wisdom of America in Council cannot be too great ..... 204 Washing-
ton like Laurens wanted all the states represented by qualified men so that more 
work could be accomplished by the committees. The army was very dependent 
on Congress for its supplies and the General understood this as well as any 
Congressman. 
Washington concluded this long letter to Banister with two more obser-
vations. The indeciSion of Congress which he never became accustomed to, 
was the first. Laurens himself was aware of this problem and once wrote to 
203Writipgs, Xl, 286. 
204Y&L, Xl, 289. 
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Washington that " .• 'tis seldom in the power of the President to answer with 
that dispatch, which may seem necessary ... ,,205 The President of Congress 
also realized that "precious time was lost" and Charles Garroll remarked in 
this April of 1778, that "The Congress does worse than ever: We murder time, 
and chat it away in idle impertinent talk: However, I hope the urgency of af-
fairs will teach even that Body (Congress) a little ciiscretlon ,,206 Congress 
did not always realize the army's need for urgency. 
The second observation made by the General was that~ 
The jealousy which Congress unhappily entertains of the Army, 
and which, if reports are right, some Members labour to estab-
lish. You may be assured there is nothing more injurious, or 
more unjustly founded. This jealousy stands upon the common, 
received Opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly 
true, that standing Armies are dangerous to a State. 207 
He continued that most nations had found fault with standing armies in time of 
peace since they consisted of "mercenaries and hirelings" but not in time of 
war. The General looked upon his men not as mercenaries but as paid citizen 
soldiers. Washington wrote, "We should all be conSidered, Congress, Army, 
etc., as one people, embarked in one Gause, in one interest; acting on the 
20 5 Letters I II, 549. 
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same principles and to the same end. ,.208 "Vashington was concerned that 
Congress so feared the army and was opposed to a standing army. Militia 
alone could not win the war. The army, Washington realized, must be subor-
dinate to the supreme civil authority of the nation but this did not mean that the 
army became the slaves of Congress. As an ex-Congressman, GeneralVVash-
ington understood that these "jealousies" would only injure the cause and war 
effort of the United Colonies. Thus he concluded his letter in a defense of 
his soldiers: 
It is unjust, because no Order of Men in the thirteen States have 
paid a more sanctimonious regard to their (Congress's) pro-
ceedings than the army ... it may be said that no history, now ex 
tant, can furnish an instance of an Army's suffering such 
uncommon hardships as ours have done, and bearing them with 
the same patience and Fortitude. 209 
Congress realized that they had made mistakes and in April they began 
to discuss the army especially after their winter at Valley Forge. Debate over 
an increase in pay for the officers lasted until May 15, 1778, when a proposal 
was passed. The debate centered about whether officers should receive half-
pay for life. Some Congressmen argued that it was. not in the power of Con-
gress to enact such a measure while others feared a standing army would 
2081Q!sL , 
209 
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result. A compromise was reached in May when Congress resolved that half-
pay be awarded t.lte officer for seven years instead of life. 210 This compro-
mise satisfied both the army and Congress. 
The scarcity of arms and ammunition still perturbed the General as he 
awaited action by the British Forces. He informed Congress of his need for the 
coming campaign: 
I shall not add upon the importance of this subject or apologize 
for giving you this trouble, as you are so well acquainted with 
the real, as well as accidental expenditure of ammunition in the 
course of a Camrign, and the fatal consequences attending a 
scarcity of it. 21 
Washingtonls orders continued to be strict in regard to the loss of gunpowder. 
He prescribed thirty-nine lashes for any soldier found wasting ammunition. 212 
DiSCipline was necessary for the army's survival. 
Congress listened to the Commander-in-Chief's petitions and tried to 
provide the needed war materiel. According to Samuel Chase, Congress had on 
hand in late April, 15,000 muskets and 200 field pieces. 213 Congress 
210Burnett, OPe cit., p. 313. 
211 Writing" XI, 315. 
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informed General Gates, Commander in the North and the favorite of som.e of 
the legislators, that on no account was he to stop the supplies destined for the 
main army. Also the "hero of Saratoga 1/ was told that no expedition should be 
undertaken without Nashington I s approval and that all requests for soldiers 
should likewise be approved by the General. 214 Congress had forgotten the 
Conway Cabal, This was the same Congress that had preferred Gates over 
Washington last winter but the rumors and jealousies against Washington no 
longer were given much attention. On April 23, 1778, Congress even mani-
fested their confidence in Washington by extending his plenary powers until 
August 10. 
'Washington learned of the French Alliance from another general, Alexan-
der McDougall, who had received the news from Simeon Deane. Deane, the 
brother of Silas, had recently returned from France to deliver the actual treaty 
to Congress which he did on May 4. 215 Congress quickly ratified the treaty. 
It seems that Washington had no official information from Congress that an al-
liance might be agreed upon in the near future, but he overlooked the slight and 
rejoiced that France had formally come to the aid of America. 216 However John 
214JoUI'Ml, X, 368. 
21 5Wrlt1nag, XI, 332. 
216112!sL, XI, 288. 
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Laurens, Washington's aide, "l'lI'ote to his father that it was not proper that the 
General of the Army should be so poorly informed of all that is knowl1 by C011-
gress of European affairs. 
Is lt not a galling circumstance, for him to collect the most im-
portant intelligence piece-meal, and as they (Congress) choose 
to give it, ... it should be considered that in order to settle his 
plans of operation for the ensuing campaign, he should take into 
view the present state of European affairs and Congress should 
not leave him in the dark. 211 
The President of CongreR£ answered his son that he was not ignorant of his 
son's complaint and that he was ashamed that Congress was so slow to en-
trust secrets to their commander. Once before, but to no avail, Henry Laurens 
had rebuked Congress for their withholding information from Washington. 218 
The French Alliance was celebrated on May 6, in Washington's camp at 
Valley Forge. A salute was given by firing first thirteen cannons, and then eacli 
soldier fired three rounds and the artillery discharged forty-four cannons. 219 
Powder could be expended since a French Alliance would mean more arms, ar-
tillery, powder I a whole army, and a navy. V{ashtngton could feel reHeved 
211 Letters, III, 228. 
2181!lliL , 
219Elijab Fisher, Journal, (New York: reprinted WilHam Abbott, 
Magazine of History, 1909), p. 19. 
96 
because what Congress could not supply, perhaps, France could. Actually 
French supplies were no greater after the treaty than before due to 
Beaumarchais's tireless service to the colonies between 1776-1778. 220 
With the summer campaign very near in the middle of May 'Nashington's 
letters continually mentioned the need of arms. Although General Knox in-
formed the General that 2,000 muskets were on tbe way to him, Washington 
asked for another 1000 as a "number of men are intirely (sic) destitute ... 221 
The General also urged Congress to see that the arms and clothing expected 
from France were sent to the army as soon as they arrived. "Our distress is 
amazingly great" he reported as recruits came into the camp without muskets.222 
Frequently other generals requested arms of Vlashington since they thought Con-
gress would best supply the Continental Army. But he was helpless to aid them 
as he wrote to General Smallwood on May 19, 1778, 
The scarcity of arms with us is so great, that I can at present 
afford no relief to your wants in this respect. I am employing 
every means we have, to collect SW'llies and shall furnish you 
as soon and as amply as possible. 3 
220Charles Van Tyne, "French Aid Before the Alliance of 1778," Ameri-
can Historical Review, XXXI, (Oct. 1925), 20-40, p. 20. 
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Occasionally 'Nashington was frustrated by having his orders countermand~;;d 
and the military stores he had expected from Springfield, Massachusetts would 
never arrive. III early June he was still making last minute preparations byob-
taining pistols and swords for his officers. 224 
On June 18, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton, the new Commander of the British 
Forces, evacuated Philadelphia and began his march towards New York. As 
Clinton's baggage train was very long, his army took seven days to march forty 
miles. 225 The Continental Army marched out of Valley Forge on June 19 and 20 
in pursuit of Clhton. On !une 28, 1778, the Continental Army attacked the 
British near Monmouth COllrt Houss but Genera:, Lee panicked and ordered the 
army to retreat. The retreai was not a rout and the battle lasted all day thanks 
to Generals 'lVashington, Knox, Greene, and '/layn3 and Von Steuben's well 
trained troops. This was the first time that tIle army displayed steadiness and 
maneuvered tactically under British fire. During the night Clinton and his 
troops, exhausted after the day's fighting, co.1t1nued their march to New York. 
This battle wa's not an Americnn victory but the Continentals had proved them-
selves ,both to Congress and iNashington. Slovlly,Nashington continued his 
224ll2!9..:, XII, 27. 
225Miller, Triumph of Freedom, p. 318 
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pursuit of the British. He set up his own camp on the White Plains where two 
years earlier he and his Continental Army had fought the same British Army. 226 
On August 3, 1778 the General wrote to Congress in praise of Quarter-
master General Greene for performing his duties well. He informed them that 
Greene had made possible his quick mobility with the whole army from Valley 
Forge until he camped at White Plains. 227 Most of the Continental Army would 
remain in the New York vicinity for the next three years while the main theatre 
of war would shift to the South. 
Throughout the fall and winter General Washington tried to obtain arms 
for his troops as there was a considerable deficiency. Washington WVed Con-
gress to send cargoes that arrived from the West Indies and France to Spring-
field, Massachusetts ufrom whence the Articles may be brought to the Army as 
they are wanted . .,228 cannon was another defiCiency within the army, and now 
that the army could perhaps lay siege to New York it would need more artillery. 
In late November, 1778, Washington wrote Congress: 
The providing of cannon is a matter of infinite importance and I 
am persuaded Congress will take every means in their power to 
226Fitzpatrick, OR. cit =, pp. 353-55. 
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accomplish it ... we cannot extend our views too soon to the ob-
taining a further large supply. We must in the course of things 
have occasion for a great deal of Artillery. 229 
However the Continental Army was always weak in artillery and depended 
heavily on French Artillery • 
The army made winter quarters near West Point while Clinton's forces 
remained in New York. In December Washington indicated to Congress that he 
desired to attend their meeting to inform them personally of the state of the 
army and what was needed to continue the war. Congress ordered the General 
to come as soon as practicable to Philadelphia. On December 24, Washington 
announced his arrival to Congress. Although the General had made known his 
desire to visit Congress, they could not simply let him come but thought the 
initiative should appear to have been taken by Congress. Thus in the Journal 
of Congress civil power indeed was supreme over the military as it is written 
that the General "persuant to their orders II appeared before Congress. 2 30 
When men like Sam Adams still feared the army, no wonder Congress-
men were "j ealous" of their power. In a letter to James Warren, Adams wrote, 
The time may come when the Sins of America may be punished by 
a standing Army; and that Time will surely come when the Body 
229Ibid., XIII, 317. 
230 3 6 Burnett, OR. cit., p. 8 • 
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of the People, shall be so lost to the Exercise of common Un-
derstanding and ~ution, as to suffer the Civil to stoop to 
Military Power. 2 
Adams was quite irritated. In his letter he mentioned that the French Count 
D'tstaing Who had arrived with his fleet in July had fired a thirteen gun salute 
to the Army but none to the Congress. Such anxieties and disputes continued 
to prevent some of the Congressmen from cooperating as well as they might 
have with the Continental Army and Washington. 
At the time of Washington's visit to Congress he shared his impressions 
with Benjamin Harrison. The General thought that the states must cooperate if 
the nation was to survive the war. There was a "lax of public virtue" which 
concerned the General as he knew the colonies were too committed to the 
cause of the revolution to withdraw or become indifferent. This lengthy quota-
tion demonstrates Washington's genuine concern. 
I have seen nothing since I came here to change my opinion of 
Men or Measrs. but abundant reason to be convinced that our 
Affairs are in a more distressed, ruinous, and deplorable con-
dition than they been Since the commencement of the ·War ... If I 
was to be called upon to draw a picture ... from what I have seen, 
heard. and in part know I would in one word say that idleness, 
dissipation and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of most 
of them •.. That party disputes and personal quarrels are the 
great business of the day whilst the momentous concerns of an 
empire ... are but secondary considerations and postponed from 
231 Letters , nI, 458. 
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day to day, week to week as if our affairs wore the most pro-
mising aspect; after drawing this picture, which from my Soul I 
believe to be a true one I need not repeat to you that I am 
alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused. 2 32 
Washington was convinced that the states should send their ablest men to 
Congress since "these characters must not slumber, nor sleep at home, in 
such times of pressing danger; they must not content themselves in places of 
honor. . while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking 
into ... ruin in which their must ultimately be involved. 1.233 Sectionalism 
blinded the Congressmen occasionally to the needs of the Continental Army and 
the cause of the colonies . Washington retained a vision of an America where 
all the colonies accepted their responsibiUties and contributed to the common-
weal. 
During this visit Washington was concerned with the pay of the army, 
arms, clothing, and plans for the cOming campaign. Military stores were still 
required for the success of the army. With Clinton in New York Washington 
knew the army might have to take the offensive and this type of warfare con-
sumed more war suppUes .234 In late January the General requested Congress 
232Writinas, XIII, 466-67. 
233Jbid . , 
234Ibid ., XIII, 488. 
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to grant him leave to return to camp. Washington was sensitive to the hard-
ships his soldiers endured while many of these legislators enjoyed the city 
comforts of Philadelphia with its many parties. On February 2, 1779, Washing-
ton gladly departed from Philadelphia for his camp at White Plains. 
'When he arrived at camp he began his preparations for the spring cam-
paign. By April Washington had not yet received all the reports as he asked 
General Knox to check what was needed so that he could order it from the 
BOard of War. Particularly there was a deficiency of small arms, powder, and 
lead. 235 The General also informed the new President of Congress, Joseph 
Reed, that the militia must come provided with arms since the Continental 
magazines were exhausted. War materiel must have come into camp for 
Washington wrote a general that 40 rounds would be sufficient for his 
troops. 2 36 Washington had returned to an army lacking many of the essentials 
necessary for winning a war, but he was forced to rely on Congress and ulti-
mately trusted in their support. 
Earlier in March the General congratulated Thomas Nelson of Virginia on 
his return to Congress. In a letter, the citizen-general remarked that the 
times called for "cool and dispassionate reasoning" as well as integrity, strict 
235JlWL , XlV, 372. 
236Ibid., XlV, 459. 
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attention, and appUcation. More than ever before Washington thought that 
political skill was required to steer Congress and keep it on the correct course. 
Unanimity in our Councils, disinterestedness in our pursuits, 
and steady perseverance in our national duty, are the only mean 
to avoid misfortunes; if they come upon us after these we shall 
have the consolation 0lJsf0wtng that we have done our best, the 
rest is with the Gods. 
Washington's interests in Congress were sincere and he desired a strong cen-
tral authority that could weld the states into a strong union. Shortly after this 
last letter, he wrote to George Mason that he could not fully express himself 
since so many aCCidents occur in the mail but he did compare Congress to a 
clock with each state representing a small part of it. All t..'le small parts, he 
wrote, endeavour to put themselves in fine order "without considering how use-
less and unavailing their labour, unless the great wheel, or spring which is to 
set the whole in motion, is also well attended to and kept in good order ... 238 
Perhaps more than anyone in Congress Washington understood the importance 
of unity and cooperation between the states, and the states and the army if 
freedom was to be won and maintained for the colonies. Congress's distrust 
of the army was difficult for Washington to understand since the soldiers were 
237.!e!S.p XIV, 246. 
238~, XlV, 301. 
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citizens of the colonies. For the present the army was as necessary as Con-
gress to protect the new nation. 
As summer approached Washington grew alarmed over the condition of 
the army. .,Our army as it now stands is but little more than the skeleton of an 
army," Washington wrote to Gouverneur Morris, "and I hear of no steps that 
are taking to give it strength and substance . .,239 So too he informed his 
brother, John V/ashington, of his concerns in May, 
This is no time for slumbering and sleeping; nor to dispute upon 
trifles, when our Battalions are to full, supplies to provide, and 
ruined finances to recover and at a crisis with Great Britain is 
ready to put forth her utmost vengence .240 
His letters repeatedly mention his fear that Congress would not be qualified 
this spring, 1119, to handle the crises. "I have never yet seen the time in 
which our affairS in my opinion, were at so Iowan ebb as at the present . .,241 
Washington also informed Morris who was in Congress that should Clinton soon 
attack he did not know what the consequences might be, but he feared the 
worst. 242 While in this same mood the General wrote Congress that little aid 
239 Jl:2J:51H XY, 25. 
240 lI2!!L, }W, 59. 
241James B. Perkins, France in the American Revolution, (Boston: 
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should be expected of the army in its present situation and that the militia were 
too poorly armed to even defend themselves. He concluded that, "How this can 
be remedied, and the army supplied, I know not. ,,243 
Although tired of trying to get arms and powder from Congress and the 
state assemblies, Washington continued to write, beg, and warn the legisla-
tors that without a strong well-supplied army the cause of independence would 
soon be lost, possibly during this summer of 1779. On Iune 9, the General 
·mote the Board of War that "I am really pained that our supplies of ammunition 
should be so miserably low, and trust that proper measures have been taken to 
place them on a more respectable footing. ,,244 For the remainder of the war 
"Wash!ngton would plead and remind Congress of the need of war materiel and 
Congress would continue to try to meet the army's demands. Friction between 
the two groups of colonists, and between Congress and the army, would con-
tinue until the army was disbanded in 1783, but relations between Congress 
and Washington would get no worse. The crises of the first years were passed 
and experience would aid both the army and Congress. 
In May of 1779, Washington believed what he wrote to Armstrong, a 
Congressman from Pennsylvania ,. "The hour therefore is certainly come when 
243.1!;Wl., p. 157. 
244Vlfritinn, )N, 248. 
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party differences and disputes should subside; when every Man, especially 
those in office, should with one hand and one heart pull the same way and with 
their whole strength. ,,245 This was Washington's vision that gave him patience 
when he tired of fighting for every musket, carL"t"fdge, or grain of powder that 
his army needed. The General felt that it was worth fighting for "this hour" of 
unity for even if did not come in 1779, it would eventually come. Congress-
men agreed that this was worth fighting for and continued to support their 
General as well as they could. 
In May, 1779, Clinton threatened West Point but only captured Stony 
POint, a small outpost on the Hudson River. Mter the main part of the British 
forces returned to New York Washington sent V'1ayne to recapture Stony Point. 
On July 16, 1779, by means of a surprise attack vVayne took Stony Point but he 
could not maintain the fort because of the lack of troops. On July 20, he re-
moved the military stores and cannon before he destroyed the small fort. He 
then led his troops back to camp near West Point. Here the Northern campaign 
ended as Wa,hington's soldiers spent the summer strengthening West Point's 
defenses and Clinton entrenched his army in New 'York. The remainder of the 
war would be mostly fought in the Southern colonies but Washington's army 
continued to harass the British about New York. The army still suffered from 
24SIbid ., XV, 99. 
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the scarcity of military stores and still had to face the miserable winter of. 
1779-1780 but it would survive. Together, the Congress and the army sur-
vived the crises of those first four years of war and there would be more in the 
remaining two, but the major crises were passed. Congress and Washington 
had kept a fighting army in the field that threatened the British Army and this 
had been the chief military strategy. So far it had worked and it would con-
tinue to work in the next two years. 
When Congress had created their military arm, the Continental Army, 
they had decided to guard its every motion. Like the earlier colonial assem-
blies they wanted the civil authority to be supreme, However, before the first 
year ended Congress had experienced the difficulties of directing and supply-
ing an army in war. The two worked very closely together often to the army's 
detriment but their disputes and misunderstandings somehow seemed to heal. 
At first Congress·s indecision to an all-out war for independence had hindered 
their support of Washing 'ton and the Continental Army. But even after July, 
1776, Congress was still slow to fully support the war effort since their fear of 
too strong an army dominated their military proposals. This fear of the army 
and of a military dictatorship harassed the progress of the army's organization 
and fostered the Conway Cabal. There were Congressmen who believed that 
the states might "lose their liberties to some aspiring general wearing the 
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uniform of the Continental army ... 246 They felt it was their duty to prevent the 
rise of any Gaesar or Cromwell. These Congressmp.n had given birth to the 
idea of the revolution and thought their cause was safe only in their hands. 
Certainly they were wary of this new class of men, the generals. 
But this fear of the military and a possible dictatorship did not blind 
some of the Congress who recognized the excellent qualities of their 
Commander-in-Chief and realized the necessity of supporting their army. John 
Adams himself had stated that the' "Liberties of America depended upon him 
(Washington), in a great d~gree. ,,241 Many in Congress worked cUligently to 
supply the Continental Army with war materiel which was a tremendous task •. 
Hancock and Laurens as Presidents of Congress continually exhorted the state 
assemblies to furnish the ContineI),tal Army with military stores'. Congress had 
successfully acquired muskets and powder for the army through the Frenchman, 
Beaumarchais, which had made the war effort possible in 1116 and 1111. So 
too, Congress assured the army further support with the French Alliance in 
1778. Congress was concerned with the army's deficiencies and in its own way 
tried to remedy them. 
246M1ller, Sam Adam" p. 344, quoting Writings of Sam Adams. In,230. 
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V'lashington realized that there were parties within Congress and 
usually he was patient in awaiting their decisions. He accepted their criti-
cism and VIlillingly supported this body of legislators who frequently were ig-
aorant of military matters. Although the General had won no major victories as 
of 1779, he had kept the Continental Army together in the field and had en-
gaged the British Army at Long Island, Brandywin~, and Monmouth. He had 
also criven Howe's army from Boston, defeated the British at Trenton, and sur-
vived the winter of Valley Forge. Throughout these years Congress with all its 
.shortcomings and fears had furnished the army with war materiel. On several 
occasions Congress had even entrusted Vlashington with dktatorial powers as 
Congressmen like Benjamin Rush realized, "General '"P/ashington must be in-
vested with dictatorial powers for a few months or we are undone. The vis 
inertiae of the Congress has almost ruined this country ... 248 V/ashington was 
saddened by Congress I s distrust of his army. He was as oppo~ed to a dictator 
as they were, and remarked that "I confess, I have felt myself greatly 
embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. ,,249 
Fortunately ;\7ashington and some Congressmen were above the routine 
business of an army and a legislative assembly. They could see beyond the 
248Porce, V, III, 1487. 
249//ritings, X, 159. 
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present crisis to a new form of government wherein independence would be 
guaranteed. The common welfare of the United Colonies came before their per-
sonal desires. Many generals could not have done all the correspondence of 
vvashington to the state assemblies and the Congress on behalf of his army's 
needs. Frequently vv'ashington begged Congress to consider the serious condi-
tion of the Continental Army. Not many generals Nould have been as 
subservient as General Nashington was to Congress. Viashington as a citizen-
soldier believed that civil authority must be superior to the military authority, 
and he directed the Continental Army according to this principle. He realized 
that Congress must be powerful if the Continental Army Nas 'to be maintained 
and the independence of the colonies won. vvashington wrote to Congressman 
Joseph Jones in the summer of 1780 that, 
Certain I am that unless Congress speaks in a more decision 
tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several states 
competent to the great purpose of war, or assume them as a 
matter of right; and they, and the States respectively, act with 
more energy than they hetherto have done, that our Cause 1s 
10st.250 
Washington was a practical man who often had to argue with Congressmen who 
were more concerned with political philosophy than with the present crisis that 
faced Congress and the army. Since the General favored a strong civil 
250Surnett, oR. cit. « p. 456. 
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authority he recogr!.ized the weaknesses within Congress. He hoped that quali-
tied men Nould come to Congress so that the army and Congress might 
cooperate in vvinning the 'Nar. So too he was disappointed when Congress 
wasted valuable time in making military decisions which injured the well-being 
of the army. Most of all he wanted Congress and the army to overcome their 
petty "jealousies." 
All these factors made it more difficult for the Congress to adequately 
supply the arrny;,rvith the much needed military stores. Congress tried to meet 
the army's demands and had partially performed their difficult task. By the fall 
of 1777, the major powder crisjs had passed but muskets continued to be 
Nanted. Military stores were neuer adequate during the war but the deficiency 
in July, 1779, ws.s much less than the scarcity of arms and powder that 
"ashingtcn had to accept as his army 1c.id siege to Boston in the winter of 
1775. Perhaps the Congress and the army were the victims of ~ war that was 
too great for a rural country.Yith limited manufacturing. Alexander Hamilton in 
1779 reflected on the first years of the war for independence in a letter to 
Robert Morris: 
The war , particularly in the first periods, required exertions 
beyond our strength, to which neither our population nor riches 
were equal. We have the fullest proof of this, in the constant 
thinness of our armies, ••. the scarcity of hands in husbandry, 
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and other occupations; the decrease of our staple commodities; 
and difficulty of every species of supply.251 
Together Congress and the army challenged a great empire. Despite 
their many differences and frustrations, Congress and the army had cooperated. 
Although there had been mismanagement within Congress, the army had been 
supplied with war ulSteriel. The Continental Army remained a loyal instrument 
in the hands of Congress and as long as Washington was Commander-in-Chief 
the legislators need not have feared a dictatorship. Civil authority would 
remain superior to military power, and yet only in union could independence 
be won and preserved. Together the Congress and Continental Army would 
pursue the war until it ended in their favor, and then the army would disband 
to allow Congress to guide and govern the new nation. 
251Montross, OPe cit., p. 243, quoting Hamilton, I, 116-11. 
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